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I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally conceded that our Anglo-American system of
tort law is based upon two fictions' and one well accepted princi-
ple.2 The first fiction is the line of reasoning that allows us to
award an individual damages after their injury.3 Theoretically, by
so doing, we make them whole and place them in the position they
were in before enduring the damaging event in question. 4 This
concept has its origins in the early development of our jurispru-
dence 5 and is well established today.6 The second is the fictional
1. See Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1418 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that determining whether a person acted as the fictional reasona-
bly prudent person is a principle of negligence); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
980 F. Sul5p. 640, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that courts are willing to indulge
in the fiction of awarding damages in tort to make the plaintiff whole).
2. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (stating that a plain-
tiff may be entitled to recover if the jury is satisfied that the defendant is charge-
able with some fault).
3. See Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 655 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (noting that courts are willing to indulge in the fiction of awarding dam-
ages in tort to make the plaintiff whole); see also Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micro
Syst., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1141 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (stating that tort law re-
duces injuries of a physical nature into monetary damages); McDougald v. Gar-
ber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1989) (suggesting that courts accept the fiction
that money damages will make a plaintiff whole with the knowledge that al-
though money neither eases suffering nor restores the victim to his pre-injury
position, this fiction comes as close as is legally possible to right the wrong); see
also Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994) (stating
that when the defendant has interfered with the plaintiff's rights and thereby
caused the defendant's injuries, compensatory damages are awarded with the
intention of making the plaintiff "whole").
4. See Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d
730, 754 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that the object of the law after an individ-
ual's negligent or willful acts have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
damage is to make the plaintiff whole); see also Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 780
(Tex. App. 2001) (stating that compensatory damages in tort are awarded with
the objective of restoring the injured party to the party's pre-injury position).
5. See Timothy D. Howell, So Long "Sweetheart"-State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Grandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest
in a Line of Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 90 n. 185 (cit-
ing Bullerdick v. Pritchard, 8 P.2d 705, 706 (Colo. 1932); ABA SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN
Strict Liability: Torts v. Products Liability
concept of the reasonable prudent person,7 a yardstick against
whom we compare the behavior of all defendants when attempting
to determine whether or not they were negligent under the circum-
stances in question. 8 Much has been written of this phenomenon
and it need not be explored here. The third basis, which is the fo-
cal point of this article, is that liability is imposed and the corre-
sponding right to recovery is given, not because the plaintiff is in-
jured, but instead because the plaintiff's injury was the result of the
defendant's fault.9
AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-29 (1984)) ("Courts and commentators have traced the
underlying compensation theory of tort law far back into history.").
6. See Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) cmt. g (1977): "[Tlhe
purpose of a tort action is to compensate for a loss sustained and to restore the
plaintiff to his former position."); see also Hutton v. Essex Group, Inc., 885 F.
Supp. 331, 333 (D.N.H. 1994) (citing to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 901 cmt. a (1977): "[Tlhe law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured
person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the
tort."); Elliot Klayman & Seth Klayman, Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-
Based Tort Reform, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 225 (2001) (stating that awards
for damages exceeding compensation are listed in the earliest known codes of
law).
7. See Beck by Chain v. Thompson, 818 F.2d 1204, 1218 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that it was a critical error of law to allow testimony on what an
individual pilot would have done rather than to require testimony on the "mythi-
cal man of legal fiction," the reasonable prudent person); see also Maddox v.
City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that determin-
ing whether a person acted as a reasonably prudent person is a principle of neg-
ligence); At. Coast Line R. Co. v. Dixon, 189 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 1951)
(stating that common law principles define negligence as not acting as a rea-
sonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances); Robinson v.
Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 393 (Wash. 1979) (noting that the law's fictitious rea-
sonable prudent person was first used in the old English case Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837)).
8. See Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. Butler, 384 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(stating that the yardstick in negligence cases is the reasonably prudent person
standard); City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Tex. 1998) (Spec-
tor, J., dissenting) (noting that the law imposes reasonably prudent person yard-
sticks in negligence cases).
9. See Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (King's Bench 1616) (stand-
ing for the proposition that a trespass without fault may serve as an excuse); see
also Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (stating that a plaintiff may be
entitled to recover if the jury is satisfied that the defendant is chargeable with
some fault).
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Fault, as we all know, is based upon the idea that the defen-
dant either intended the injury (juries will be asked to determine
whether the resulting harm was a substantial certainty),' 0 or that
the defendant was negligent in failing to act in a reasonable man-
ner once he was confronted with a foreseeable risk." One or the
other of these two scenarios must be in place before the plaintiff
will be entitled to recover. 12 The majority of litigation is involved
with one or both of these issues.13 A very small number, however,
involve cases wherein the fault of the defendant is not an issue.
14
Instead, the defendant's liability is said to be based upon liability
without fault, or as it is more commonly referred, strict liability. 
1 5
10. See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985)
(stating that to establish intentional conduct, the known danger must be more
than a risk and must become a substantial certainty); see also Spivey v.
Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972) (noting that any conduct short of
substantial certainty cannot be intentional).
11. See Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 713 A.2d 442, 445 (N.J. 1998) (stat-
ing that in tort law there is a general obligation to avoid foreseeable risk of harm
to others); see also Udy v. Custer County, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Idaho 2001)
(stating that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable foreseeable
harm to others).
12. See Farmers & Merch. State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921
(Tex. 1981) (implying that under the common law, a plaintiff can recover for
certain types of damages if he can show the defendant engaged in intentional or
negligent conduct); see also Wallace v. Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (noting the key distinction between the two divisions of tort liability:
negligence and intent).
13. See Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1998) (stat-
ing that a majority of states have noted the difference between intentional and
unintentional (negligence) cases); see also Serina v. Albertston's, Inc., 744 F.
Supp. 1113, 1117 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that there is a "solid precedent"
comprised of a majority of states that do not treat negligence and intentional
torts equally).
14. See McLaughlin v. Watts, 1995 WL 809501, *2 (Mass. Jan. 18, 1995)
(stating that one use of land where the law will impose strict liability is the stor-
age of water, which the court characterizes as relatively rare); see also Acushnet
Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 988, 1000 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that strict
liability in the twentieth century is applied only in limited circumstances); Saiz
v. Belen School Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 112 (N.M. 1992) (noting that in only a
small number of cases regarding independent contractors, courts have had to
impose strict liability where inherently dangerous activities are involved).
15. See Chavez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (E.D.
Cal. 1976) (stating the rationale behind the imposition of strict liability for haul-
ing explosives in railroad cars); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
Vol. 33
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Strict liability in tort law is very limited. 16 Our judiciary has
been extremely jealous in confining this idea to seven distinct sce-
narios. 17 These scenarios include animals that are trespassing, are
domesticated but vicious, or are wild by nature,18 or fact situations
involving ultra-hazardous activities, 9 nuisance,20 misrepresenta-
21 22 23tion, vicarious liability, defamation, or a workman's compen-
519 (1977) (setting forth activities that are abnormally dangerous).
16. See Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating
that the imposition of strict liability occurs in only very limited situations); see
also Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 648 (Wash. 1954) (stating that
strict liability is not imposed in order to protect against harms incident to an
individual's unusual land use).
17. See Goodwin v. Reilley, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (Cal. App. 1985)
(stating that familiar examples of activities that give rise to strict liability include
the keeping of animals with vicious tendencies and dangerous and uncommon
usages of land such as blasting); see also Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1259
(Or. 1982) (stating that modern strict liability cases include keeping explosives
and crop dusting with destructive chemicals).
18. See Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 651 (1878) (stating the rule of
law that those who allow into the public wild animals that are known to be "mis-
chievous" and where those animals do harm are strictly liable); see also Zarek v.
Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689, 690 (3d Cir. 1943) (stating the rule that when an ani-
mal is known to have vicious propensities, the owner is liable for any harm it
causes regardless of the care taken to guard against such harm); Marshall v.
Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. 1974) (stating that although owners of
vicious animals are subject to strict liability, not all animals are vicious and the
careless owners of non vicious animals may only be subject to suits based on
negligence for their handling of their animals).
19. See Chisholm v. UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 731, 743 (4th Cir.
2000) (stating that strict liability is imposed for several reasons including ultra-
hazardous activities); see also Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)
(holding that strict liability could be imposed for containing water).
20. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating
that the rules of strict liability are imposed in nuisance situations); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
21. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 221 (Colo.
1982) (holding that tort claims based on theories of strict liability for misrepre-
sentations are not precluded by statutory provisions requiring express contrac-
tual remedies); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
22. See Blanchard v. Ogima, 215 So. 2d 902, 906 (La. 1968) (setting
forth the requirements for vicarious liability when issues of the right of control
are present); see also United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 696 (5th
Cir. 1985) (stating that a corporation can be vicariously liable for the actions of
a corporation found to be an alter ego of the parent corporation even in the ab-
sence of any fault of the parent).
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sation statute.24 There may be isolated instances involving other
fact patterns, but these are the primary examples of situations
wherein fault is not of primary concern when determining the
plaintiffs right to recover. 25 As each is discussed and compared to
the others, we shall see that the underlying reasons for the rule dif-
fer in each case and that each in turn is quite different from the
rationale of strict products liability under section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.26
II. ANIMALS
When concerned with the issue of animals, strict liability has
been applied in any one of three different and distinct fact pat-
27 28terns. The first involves trespassing animals, and this is fol-
23. See Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 394
(5th Cir. 1987) (noting that a possible consequence of unreasonable publications
about employees in the workplace is to hold employers strictly liable); see also
Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that, histori-
cally, defamation suit defendants who had mistakenly identified individuals in
their statements were nonetheless strictly liable).
24. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 292,
296 (Tex. App. 1965) (acknowledging strict liability under Workman's Com-
pensation Law); see also Estate of Richard v. Am. Wrecking Corp., 134 F.
Supp. 2d 252, 257 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting that the Workmen's Compensation
statute imposed a form of strict liability on employers).
25. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Trouble with Negligence, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1222 (2001) (noting that no-fault insurance is a form of
strict liability); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability
and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1333 (2001) (stating
that enterprise liability is a modern theory of strict liability).
26. See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability
for Ultra-Hazardous Activities from Strict Products Liability Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning
that Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REV. 31, 40 (2001) (noting that the rea-
sons behind the imposition of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities are
different from the reasons underlying strict products liability under 402A); see
also Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 363, 423 n. 110 (1984) (noting that strict products liability and traditional
strict liability are different doctrines).
27. See McPherson v. James, 69 I11. App. 337 (1896) (holding owner of
trespassing barnyard animals strictly liable for damages caused by the animals);
Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1974) (stating that animals with
known dangerous propensities will impose strict liability on their owners);
Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60-61 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating the well-
Vol. 33
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lowed by domesticated animals with vicious tendencies as well as
animals which are described as being ferae naturae, or those
whose natural habitat is in the wild.29 This reasoning has been part




From the earliest period, English common law has applied
strict liability to cases involving trespassing animals.31 Typically,
the scenario in question involved what today is thought of as farm
yard animals-horses, cattle, sheep and hogs.32 These animals are
settled strict liability law regarding animals ferae naturae that landowners are
held liable for a wild animal's acts upon the landowner's property only if the
animal has been in the possession and control of the landowner or has been in-
troduced as a non-indigenous species to the area).
28. See Adams Bros. v. Clark, 224 S.W. 1046, 1050 (Ky. App. Ct. 1920)
(holding animal's owner strictly liable when his trespassing chickens ate grain
and garden produce from a neighbor's land).
29. See Belger v. Sweeney, 836 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App. 1992) (stat-
ing that dog owners are strictly liable for damages caused by their dogs if the
owners know the dogs are vicious); see also Villarreal v. Elizondo, 831 S.W.2d
474, 477 (Tex. App. 1992) (showing that strict liability may be imposed on an
owner of a vicious animal if the animal has known vicious or dangerous propen-
sities and the injuries the animal caused resulted from the animal's dangerous
characteristics).
30. See DeHart v. Austin, Ind., 39 F.3d 718, 720 n.l (7th Cir. 1994) (set-
ting forth a definition of "wild" animal to include any animal that has "histori-
cally" been found in the wild); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7
HARV. L. REv. 441, 450-51 (1894) (stating that strict liability for trespassing
cattle dates back to the thirteenth century).
31. See Rylands, 35 L.J. Exe. at 156 (stating that one who keeps a thing
of danger on his property is strictly liable for damages if the thing escapes); see
also J.W. Looney, Rylands v. Fletcher Revisited: A Comparison of English,
Australian and American Approaches to Common Law Liability for Dangerous
Agricultural Activities, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 149, 171 n. 174 (1996) (noting that
the imposition of strict liability on an animal's keeper for the harm caused by the
escaped and dangerous animal is a well-established common law concept).
32. See, e.g, Bischoff v. Cheney, 92 A. 660, 661 (Conn. 1914) (distin-
guishing cats from other types of species of domestic animals that are "inclined
to mischief," such as roving cattle that eat and trample crops); see also McDon-
ald v. Castle, 243 P. 215, 216 (Okla. 1925) (distinguishing dogs from other types
of domestic animals and noting that the common law presumption is that the dog
is docile, tame and harmless to property and persons, unless the dog's owner has
2003
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capable of inflicting extensive harm when forcing their way onto
the property of another.33 It is for this reason that strict liability
was imposed when animals of this sort made an unauthorized entry
upon a neighbor's land.34 The trespass was equated to that of the
animal's owner themselves, and little was made as to whether or
not negligence had been involved.35 Instead, emphasis was placed
on the control, or lack thereof, as a cause of the injury.36 Interest-
ingly, other animals with definite household characteristics, such
as dogs and cats, which are known to wander and yet inflict little
or no damage when so doing, were allowed total freedom. 37 Own-
actual knowledge to the contrary).
33. See Katherine L. Butler, Coastal Protection of Sea Turtles in Florida,
13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 399, 406 (1998) (describing the destructiveness of
feral hogs on the natural habitat of indigenous species such as the sea turtle); see
also John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Alternative Communities for the High Plains: An
Exploratory Essay on Holistic Responses to Issues of Environment, Economy,
and Society, 34 URB. LAW. 73, 77 (2002) (stating that the American Plains were
never really well suited to the environmental destruction of overgrazing that
large herds of cattle are capable of wreaking).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 cmt. b (1977).
35. See Douglas H. Cook, Negligence or Strict Liability? A Study in Bib-
lical Tort Law, 13 WrtrFIER L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1992) (noting that strict liability
disregards fault and that strict liability survives today in the area of trespassing
animals); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., The Standard of Care for Veterinarians
in Medical Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN. L. REv. 1, 69 n.298 (1990) (noting
that statutes provide for varying degrees of strict liability for injuries caused by
trespassing animals).
36. See Harry R. Bader & Greg Finstad, Conflicts Between Livestock and
Wildlife: An Analysis of Legal Liabilities Arising from Reindeer and Caribou
Competition on the Seward Peninsula of Western Alaska, 31 ENVTL. L. 549, 558
(2001) (noting that strict liability may be imposed on owners of animals ferae
domesticae if the owner fails to exercise proper control over the animal); see
also James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and the Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and
the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217, 230
(2001) (stating that wild animals are often inherently difficult to control and
strict liability has been imposed on individuals who harbor them).
37. See Cindy Andrist, Is There (And Should There Be) Any "Bite" Left
in Georgia's "First Bite" Rule?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2000) (stating that
historically, dog and cat ownership has been treated differently under strict li-
ability principles than ownership of animals such as bears and lions); see also
Keith A. Cutler, When Man's Best Friend Bites, 54 J. Mo. B. 24, 24 (1998)
(noting the special place the dog has in society and the importance of the
owner's knowledge of the dog's propensities in assessing the owner's liability
Vol. 33
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ers were never held responsible for the trespass of such household
pets.38 In retrospect it is clear that the reasoning for imposing strict
liability in the case of trespassing animals and not with others was
based upon the seriousness or foreseeability of injury to the local
residents.39 If the entry was likely to be harmless, strict liability
was not an issue.40
Historically, it should be noted that in the United States the
idea of strict liability for trespassing animals was not well re-
ceived.4' Perhaps because of our vast areas and the ever present
movement westward, owners of trespassing animals were held to
more traditional concepts of liability based upon negligence.42
for the dog's actions).
38. See Olson v. Pederson, 288 N.W. 856, 857 (Minn. 1939) (stating that
the cattle trespass rule does not apply to dogs); see also Lewis v. Great South-
west Corp., 473 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex. App. 1971) (noting that an owner of
domesticated animal cannot be held liable for damages the animal causes in a
place where the animal has a right to be, unless the owner knows, or should
know, the animal has vicious propensities).
39. See Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 200,
206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that a trespassing animal's owner has been
found strictly liable for the actions of the animal that were reasonably to be ex-
pected from the animal's trespass such as crop damage, spreading of disease, or
the breeding of a pedigreed heifer with a scrub bull); see also Molton v. Young,
204 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. App. 1947) (stating that at common law, a domesti-
cated animal's owner was precluded from allowing his animals to run at large,
but was required to enclose them and upon the owner's failure to do so, the
owner was unconditionally liable for any damages caused by the animal's tres-
pass).
40. See Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 188 A. 223, 228 (Md. 1936) (stat-
ing that a dog owner who had no knowledge of any dangerous propensities of
the dog which had trespassed was not liable for the dog's trespasses); see also
Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 129 N.W. 1065, 1066 (Wis. 1911) (stating that an
owner of trespassing cattle may be negligent, but not strictly liable, if the cattle
were being lawfully driven along the highway).
41. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1277
(2001) (stating that traditional strict liability laws were relaxed in the American
West due to the economics of agriculture such as the cost of putting up fences);
see also Colby Dolan, Examining the Viability of Another Lord of Yesterday:
Open Range Laws and Livestock Dominance in the Modern West, 5 ANIMAL L.
147, 148 (1999) (stating that while in the American East, some jurisdictions
followed the English common law's rules for strict liability for damages caused
by errant cattle, Western states developed statutory exceptions to strict liability).
42. See Dunbar v. Emigh, 158 P.2d 311, 314 (Mont. 1945) (stating the
rule that unless the defendant willfully or negligently drives cattle onto another's
2003
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Once, however, competition for space arose between cattlemen and
those engaged in agriculture, the law began to change.43 Since
cattle traditionally grazed on the open plains and were allowed to
roam at will, some states, especially in the west, began to impose
the requirement that land owners "fence out" any unwanted intru-
sions.4 If cattle forced their way through the fence of a farmer,
strict liability was imposed, but in all other cases liability was
based upon the concept of negligence. 45 In other states, however,
where agriculture was more important, "fence in" statutes required
46the owners of cattle to control their animals. In these instances,
strict liability was imposed if the cattle escaped from the owner's
land, trespassed and caused injury.47 All other liability, however,
unfenced land where the animals cause damage, the defendant is not liable for
the animals' trespass); see also Beinhorn v. Griswold, 69 P. 557, 558 (Mont.
1902) (stating that the English common law regarding trespassing cattle has
been modified in Montana).
43. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890) (noting that the common
law of England regarding trespassing cattle was not applicable in American
states with fencing laws); see also Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640, 644 (Ariz.
1942) (stating that the purpose of fencing laws was to force a landowner to fence
to keep animals off of the landowner's property).
44. See Hart v. Meredith, 553 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(showing that strict liability may be imposed through a fencing statute); see also
Ramey v. Richardson, 397 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App. 1965) (stating that ani-
mals that have escaped through no fault of the owner are not engaged in the
statutorily prohibited act of running at large).
45. See McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971) (stat-
ing that an owner who does not properly fence his property has no cause of ac-
tion for damages done by cattle that enter the land); see also Parker v. Reter, 383
P.2d 93, 94 (Or. 1963) (noting that the statutory prohibition against allowing
livestock to enter another person's land in a livestock district that prohibits cattle
from running at large also prohibits a person from negligently permitting live-
stock to walk on a highway).
46. See Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So. 2d 761, 762 (Fla. 1996) (discussing the
common law "fence in" doctrine before upholding a summary judgment deci-
sion in favor of landowner who did not know how the gate that allowed a cow
out onto the highway where it was struck by a vehicle had been opened); see
also Selby v. Bullock, 287 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1973) (holding that a statute that
required individuals who suffered damages resulting from livestock moving
along a public highway to prove negligence on the part of the owners was not
unconstitutional).
47. See Toole v. Dupuis, 735 So. 2d 582, 582-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that statutes governing livestock owner's duty concerning situa-
tion where his cattle are on public roads do not give rise to strict liability, but
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was based upon the more traditional concept of negligence.
48
Which type of statute was enacted was determined by the impor-
tance of cattle or farming to the local economy. 49 As in other
situations, the common law evolved pursuant to the needs of spe-
cial interests.50 This has happened with other pressure groups, and
cattlemen and farmers were no exception.
51
Finally, some states have made a total return to the English
position of strict liability.52 This is particularly true in areas that
rather, the plaintiff must show that owner negligently or intentionally allowed
his livestock to stray upon public road); see also Fisel, 667 So. 2d at 764 (stating
that the rule in Selby v. Bullock remains the law in Florida).
48. See Shively v. Dry Creek Cattle Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 243 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (stating that livestock owners in a county operating under open
range law are not required to fence in the owners' cattle but the owners have the
duty to exercise ordinary care); see also Carver v. Ford, 591 P.2d 305, 308
(Okla. 1979) (stating that a statute mandating that domestic animals be pre-
vented from running at large was not meant to impose strict liability on the
owner of a heifer that had merely escaped from its stall and the plaintiff would
need to prove negligence or intentional trespass).
49. See David S. Steward, Agricultural Fence Law: Good Fences Make
Good Neighbors, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 725 (1995) (stating that Iowa's fence
out law was reasonably necessary for the public purposes when large acres of
grazing land were critical for Iowa's economy); see also HARVEY KATZ,
SHADOW ON THE ALAMO (1972) (describing the cattle industry's influence over
the Texas state lawmaking process months after the new state constitution of
1876 was passed).
50. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH
TO POWER 80 (Vintage Book ed., Random House 1990) (1981) (claiming that
even in the early part of the 20th Century, special interest groups virtually con-
trolled the Texas Legislature); James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private
Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 241, 274 (1994) (listing the influ-
ence on the law that agriculture, timber, mining and other special interests have
had during the last century).
5I. See Jeff Brax, Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q.
549, 572 n.131 (2000) (describing how some judges view the influence of envi-
ronmental interest groups on developing laws); Fred H. Miller, The Future of
Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861, 868-
69 (1995) (countering criticisms about the influence of interest groups during
the process of revising the Uniform Commercial Code).
52. See King v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 123 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H.
1956) (stating that a livestock owner is strictly liable for damage caused by his
trespassing livestock, irrespective of negligence); Noyes v. Colby, 30 N.H. 143,
147 (1855) (holding that an owner of a cow was liable in trespass when the cow,
after being turned out to pasture by another individual, trespassed on another's
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are closely settled, such as our northeastern seaboard.53 Techno-
logical advancements brought industrialization into direct competi-
tion with mankind for the land that was once so plentiful, and as a
result the law was changed to best serve the needs of those in-
volved.54
B. Domesticated Animals with Vicious Tendencies
There are certain animals which for eons have been domesti-
cated Originally in the wild, they have long since lost their feral
56 5characteristics. The classic example would be dogs and cats.57
land).
53. See Christine LaRocca, New Jersey's Solid Waste Flow Control
Regulations Have Been Trashed: Are Environmental Investment Charges the
Answer?, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 124 (1999) (stating that the northeastern
states are densely populated); Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Chal-
lenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1996) (stating that the northeastern corridor of
the United States is densely populated).
54. See Terence J. Centner, Reforming Outdated Fence Law Provisions:
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors Only If They Are Fair, 12 J. ENVTL L. &
LrriG. 267, 275 (1997) (asserting that population changes, technology, and the
economy alter the welfare ramifications of available fence-out rules); Robert C.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 660-61 (1986) (stating that increasing popula-
tions in California led to the eradication of fence out rules in that state).
55. See Paul Blunt, Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living Or-
ganisms, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1365, 1380-81 (1998) (stating that the modern
domesticated dog has been bred from wolves); see also Geordie Duckler, The
Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argu-
ment for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199, 204 (2002) (stating that humans
began domesticating dogs in approximately 15,000 B.C.E.).
56. See Duckler, supra note 55, at 208 n.36 (arguing that domestication is
more than "taming" and dogs and cats are largely the product of the human ma-
nipulation of hereditary characteristics). But see Barbara J. Kramek, The Hy-
brids Howl: Legislators Listen-These Animals Aren't Crying Wolf, 23 RUTGERS
L.J. 633, 643-44 (1992) (describing cross breeding Alaskan Malamutes with
wolves to create a troublesome hybrid).
57. See Duckler, supra note 55, at 200 (arguing that modern trends in the
law are trying to elevate domesticated dogs and cats beyond the realm of prop-
erty altogether); Andrea Hart Herbster, More than Pigs in a Parlor: An Explora-
tion of the Relationship Between the Law and Keeping Pigs as Pets, 86 IoWA L.
REV. 339, 358 (2000) (claiming the law discriminates between traditional do-
mesticated animals such as dogs and cats and pet pigs which are stereotyped as
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Even when mankind followed a nomadic existence, dogs were
known to be part of the family. 58 Cats enjoyed a similar relation-
ship.59 As a general rule, any liability imposed for injury inflicted
by an animal of this kind is based upon actionable negligence.
60
However, the law is clear that when such an animal is known to
have a vicious trait, the basis of liability is different.6' Once the
owner knows, or should know, his pet is likely to attack, strict li-
ability will follow. 62 The reasoning in these cases is that an indi-
vidual has undertaken to keep such an animal when he is aware of
its tendency. 63 Responsibility is therefore based, not on control, as
dirty).
58. See State ex rel Kroger Co. v. Craig, 329 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959) (describing how dogs were more than just pets to the Egyptians,
Greeks and Ethiopian tribesmen); see also Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confu-
sion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets' Anthropomorphic Qualities
Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 32 (2001) (stating that
pets have been treasured by people since ancient times).
59. See Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing
Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1064 (1995) (noting that
the ancient Egyptian Pharaohs kept cats for companionship); Sonia S. Waisman
and Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of 'Non Economic' Damages for Wrongful
Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7
ANIMAL L. 45, 57 (2001) (stating that cats were household pets in Egypt almost
5000 years ago).
60. See Duren v. Kunkel, 814 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Mo. 1991) (stating that
where the defendant failed to protect the plaintiff from a bull, plaintiff was enti-
tled to a jury question on negligence); Pearson v. Jones Co., 898 S.W.2d 329,
332 (Tex. App. 1994) (stating that an owner of a nonvicious animal could be
held liable on a negligence theory for mishandling the creature).
61. See Moore v. Moore, No. 04-00-00831-CV, 2001 WL 1360014, at *1
(Tex. App. Nov. 7, 2001) (stating that when an owner knows his animal's vi-
cious tendencies, the owner is subject to strict liability); Lindsey v. Fuentes, No.
01-99-00982-CV, 2000 WL 1867984, at *3 (Tex. App. Dec. 21, 2000) (stating
that in suits for damages caused by a vicious animal, strict liability applies).
62. See Ted Fair, Comment, Personal Injuries by Animals in Texas, 4
BAYLOR L. REv. 183 (1952) (stating the reasons behind the imposition of strict
liability for keeping a vicious animal); see also Van Houten v. Pritchard, 870
S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ark. 1994) (stating that strict liability did not apply to cat-bite
case because owner did not have knowledge of the cat's viciousness); Wells v.
Bums, 480 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tex. App. 1972) (applying strict liability for the
keeping of a vicious animal).
63. See Garza v. Thomason, No. 04-95-00149-CV, 1995 WL 679681, at
*1 (Tex. App. Nov. 15, 1995) (reasoning that defendant landlord of animal's
owner could not be held strictly liable for animal attack because landlord did not
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with trespassing animals, but instead upon the knowledge of the
likelihood that harm is to be expected. 64
The question of knowledge is an interesting one.65 The fact
66that the animal has never attacked is not controlling. Instead, the
issue is whether the animal had a propensity to do so. 6 7 Evidence
that the animal was usually restrained, snarled, bared its teeth or
did not socialize well with individuals will impute knowledge of its
vicious tendency. 68 This is enough to invoke strict liability.
69
have a duty to control the animal).
64. See David A. Elder, 2001: An End of Millennium Odyssey Through
Tort Liability of Occupiers and Owners of Land, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 352, 356
n.54 (2001) (noting that some courts refuse to impose strict liability absent a
showing of actual knowledge of an animal's vicious character).
65. See generally, DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Hackett Publishing Co. 1977) (1748) (explaining the philoso-
pher's interest in a theory of knowledge); RONALD SUTER, INTERPRETING
WIFIGENSTEIN: A CLOUD OF PHILOSOPHY, A DROP OF GRAMMAR 124 (1989)
(explaining the philosopher Wittengenstein's contention that the verb "to know"
expresses in its ordinary usage a complete absence of doubt and Cartesian phi-
losophers and skeptics such as David Hume violate this ordinary usage by mis-
using the word "know" in their philosophical writings).
66. See Andrist, supra note 37, at 1345 (stating that the Georgia Court of
Appeals decisions have recognized that knowledge of a dog's threatening behav-
ior does not, by itself, put an owner on notice of the dog's propensity towards
aggression); Julie A. Thorne, If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Should Dick and Jane
go to Jail?: An Analysis of Existing Pet Control Legislation, Tort Liability, and
the Trend Towards Imposing Criminal Liability on the Owners of Dangerous
and Vicious Animals, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1445, 1471 (1988) (noting that
although 'first bite' rules have been on the wane, "some jurisdictions still re-
quire that the owner have actual knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensi-
ties").
67. See Hamilton v. Walker, 510 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(showing that in order to be held strictly liable, the owner must have knowledge
of the dog's propensity to engage in a particular act that causes injury); Lagoda
v. Dorr, 28 A.D.2d 208, 209-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (stating that the action's
gravamen is the owner's knowledge that the dog had vicious or mischievous
propensities).
68. See Carter v. Ide, 188 S.E.2d 275, 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (showing
that without more evidence, such as growling at humans, the owners could not
be said to have sufficient knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities); Searcy
v. Brown, 607 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex. App. 1980) (stating that plaintiffs must
show by the evidence that the dog owner knew or should have known the dog
was disposed to injuring humans).
69. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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C. Animals Whose Habitat is Usually in the Wild
Unlike dogs and cats, some animals are, as a general rule,
found in the wild.70 In reference to these animals, the law is quite
71clear. If one undertakes to capture and retain such an animal as a
pet, strict liability will be imposed for any subsequent injury.
72
The reasoning seems to be that individuals have no need for these
exotic animals. 73 Bobcats, lions, and tigers, for example, are best
left in their natural habitat.74 Additionally, we know that injury of
some sort is likely when we undertake to keep this type of an ani-
mal.75 As a result, one keeps such animals at his own peril.76
70. See DeHart v. Town of Austin, 39 F.3d 718, 720 n. I (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting 9 C.F.R. § 1.1) (defining wild animal as "any animal which is now or
historically has been found in the wild, or in the wild state"); see also Richard
A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA.
L. REv. 535, 544 (2000) (stating that English Common Law distinguished cer-
tain types of wild animals from those having animus revertendi, or a habit of
returning, which makes those wild animals more similar to domestic animals).
71. See Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60-61 (Tex. App. 1999)
(stating that theferae naturae rule creating a cause of action in strict liability is
well-settled); Overstreet v. Gibson Product Co., 558 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App.
1977) (dismissing the plaintiff's strict liability cause of action because there was
no evidence the defendant harbored a wild rattlesnake).
72. See Nicholson, 986 S.W.2d at 60 (stating that a landowner is not li-
able for any injuries caused by animalsferae naturae unless the landowner actu-
ally possesses or controls the animals); Gowen v. Willenborg, 366 S.W.2d 695,
697 (Tex. App. 1963) (stating that an owner of land is not required to anticipate
animals ferae naturae entering his property unless such owner undertakes to
possess or harbor the animals).
73. See Collins v. Otto, 369 P.2d 564, 566 (Colo. 1962) (stating that strict
liability for keeping a wild and vicious animal is predicated upon the fact that
the keeper's conduct is unjustified); see also Briley v. Mitchell, 115 So. 2d 851,
855 (La. 1951) (stating that though a person has a judicially recognized right to
exhibit a wild animal, the right is privileged, and the person assumes the role of
an insurer to the public).
74. See Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1878) (noting that
wild deer in their natural habitat are dangerous during certain seasons, and stat-
ing that the gist of a strict liability cause of action against the keeper of a wild
animal is the keeping of the animal); see also Hudson v. Janesville Conservation
Club, 484 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Wis. 1992) (stating the court's opinion that an ani-
mal is "probably wild" if the "animal normally survives without human assis-
tance" in nature, or has not been domesticated and usually lives outdoors, or is
incapable of being tamed).
75. See Crunk v. Glover, 95 N.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Neb. 1959) (detailing
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In summary, we can see that strict liability in the case of ani-
mals is applied to three situations.77 In each case the reasoning for
doing so is different. 78 Some trespassing animals are capable of
inflicting great harm when forcing themselves onto a neighbor's
land.79 For this reason strict liability is imposed when their owner
80fails to exercise proper control. On the other hand, domesticated
animals with vicious tendencies as well as animals normally found
in the wild are likely to cause harm to others, even absent a tres-
the severe injuries a farmer sustained to his hand after being savaged by a caged
bear); see also Franken v. City of Sioux Ctr., 272 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Iowa 1978)
(describing the severe lacerations a man who had put his hand into the cage of a
tiger sustained and how the tiger's jaws had to be pried apart with a steel bar to
release the man's hand). Cf. Ollhoff v. Peck, 503 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that a park patron who was bitten while trying to "pet" a
large-toothed fish basking on the surface of a park pond could not utilize a strict
liability cause of action against the park owner for keeping a dangerous animal).
76. See Smith v. La. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 199, 202 (La.
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting the jury charge that instructed the jury that he who
keeps a dangerous animal does so at his own peril); Nelson v. Hansen, 102
N.W.2d 251, 256 (Wis. 1960) (noting there is a line of a cases that hold that if
an individual keeps a dangerous animal, he does so at his own peril).
77. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Standard of Care for Veterinarians in
Medical Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN. L. REV. 1, 67 n.287 (1990) (noting strict
liability principles are applicable to owners of wild, domesticated but vicious,
and trespassing animals); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in
Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1285-86 (1997) (discussing tres-
passing animals, wild animals, and domestic animals with vicious tendencies).
78. See Looney, supra note 31, at 149 n.174 (setting out three situations
where strict liability is imposed for animals); see also JOHN H. WADE ET AL.,
PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 683-86 (10th
ed. 2000) (explaining the three types of situations involving animals where strict
liability may be imposed and the reasons therefore).
79. See Centner, supra note 54, at 285 (commenting that trespassing live-
stock may affect use and enjoyment of property as well as the overall landscape
and many of the costs are hard to quantify); JIM HIGHTOWER, THERE'S NOTHING
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD BUT YELLOW STRIPES AND DEAD ARMADILLOS
186 (1997) (noting that pound-for-pound, hogs generate nearly twice as much
natural excretions as cattle do, thereby polluting the environment).
80. Molton v. Young, 204 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. App. 1947) (stating
that, under common law, if a domestic animal owner failed to control his animal,
and it trespassed upon another's property, the animal owner was unconditionally
liable); see also Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 188 A. 223, 229 (Md. 1936)
(holding that owner's failure to control hunting dogs imposed liability on him
for their trespass).
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pass. 8 1 The gist in these instances is that an individual has know-
ingly elected to keep a dangerous animal, and as a consequence,
must do so at his own risk.82
III. ULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES
Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is a relatively new
concept in Anglo-American jurisprudence and can be traced to the
venerable English case of Rylands v. Fletcher.83 In this case, the
defendant undertook to erect reservoirs on his land so as to supply
his mills with a source of energy.84 After proper and careful con-
sultation with an engineer and contractor, the pools were built and
filled.85 The weight of the water, however, proved to be too much,
and the tanks collapsed, flooding an underground coal mine be-
longing to the plaintiff.86 Suit was brought and on an appeal to the
House of Lords it was decided that the defendant would be held
responsible even though there was a total absence of fault.87 Going
to great lengths in making a distinction between natural and un-
natural uses of land, the court held that by bringing water onto his
81. See Harvey v. Buchannan, 49 S.E. 281, 282 (Ga. 1904) (quoting from
the Georgia statutes for the proposition that an owner of a known vicious animal
of any kind shall be liable for any damages the animal causes regardless of
fault); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 518 (1977) (mandating strict liabil-
ity for the owner of domestic animal with known vicious propensities).
82. See Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 51 (st
Cir. 1997) (finding that the hotel was not liable to injured guest who was bitten
by a mongoose, because the hotel did not "control" the animal although it nor-
mally fed on the hotel grounds); Williams v. Johnson, 781 P.2d 922, 925 (Wyo.
1989) (holding that plaintiff would have to prove the owners had actual knowl-
edge of the animal's dangerous proclivities if they were going to recover).
83. 3 L.R.-E & I App. 330 (H.L. 1868); see also David Howarth, Muddy-
ing the Waters: Tort Law and the Environment from an English Perspective, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 469,494 (2002) (summarizing the famous English case).
84. Rylands, 3 L.R.-E & I App. at 331; see generally Sarah C. Richard-
son, The Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project Relicensing, 25
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 499, 501 (2000) (describing the histori-
cal importance of watermills as a source of energy that helped power the Indus-
trial Revolution).
85. Rylands, 3 L.R.-E & I App. at 331-32.
86. Id. at 332.
87. Id. at 339-40.
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land the defendant would be held strictly liable if it escaped and
caused injury.
88
Subsequent English cases continue to follow this "natural"
versus "unnatural" line of reasoning. 89 In so doing, the courts have
emphasized two facts.90 They have looked not only at the charac-
ter of the activity in question, but also to the appropriateness of this
conduct to the surroundings. 91 If it is determined that the defen-
dant's actions are not suitable or apropos to the locale, strict liabil-
ity will be imposed upon the defendant for any resulting injury.
92
A majority of the jurisdictions in the United States that have
considered the issue have adopted the rule of Rylands, but remain
reluctant to impose strict liability as a blanket concept. 93 Instead,
the United States jurisdictions seem much more inclined to hold
the defendant responsible only when we can establish fault.
94
88. Id.
89. See Cambridge Water Co. v. E. Counties Leather Plc., [1994] 2 App.
Cas. 264, 302-03 (appeal taken from H.L.(E.)) (stating that it is the knowledge
that a thing placed on one's property is likely to escape that establishes liability);
Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd., [1947] App. Cas. 156, 170 (appeal taken from
H.L.(E.)) (relying in a munitions case on the rule set down in Rylands v.
Fletcher).
90. See Cambridge Water Co., 2 App. Cas. at 308-09 (applying Rylands
to categorize an action as ultra hazardous); Read, App. Cas. at 181-82 (explain-
ing the history of Rylands rule and the reasons for finding the defendant strictly
liable for his use of the property).
91. See Read, App. Cas. at 181-82 (showing the reasoning behind the
Ryland rule); see also Andrew Allen Lemmon, The Developing Doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher: Hazardous Waste Remediation Contractors Beware, 42
Loy. L. REV. 287, 293-94 (1996) (describing the development of the English
doctrine and how some American courts also look to the appropriateness of
activity to the location when determining whether to apply strict liability).
92. See Smith v. Kendrick, 7 C.B. 515, 564-66 (1849) (describing normal
mining operations for the area); see also Read, App. Cas. at 182 (reasoning that
appropriate production of explosives did not automatically implicate strict liabil-
ity).
93. See Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72
HARV. L. REV. 401, 432-33 n.62 (1959) (noting that many courts have been
reluctant to approve Rylands by name but have employed some its reasoning).
94. See Victor B. Flatt, "He Should At His Peril Keep it There . . . ":
How the Common Law Tells Us That Risk Based Corrective Action is Wrong, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 367 (2001) (stating that some states have not adopted
the Rylands strict liability doctrine, but many courts often reach similar results
by applying nuisance law); R. Thomas Lay, Dam Failures: Common and
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When the principle of strict liability has been applied to these so-
called ultra-hazardous activities, it has been in very limited cir-
cumstances.95 In essence, it has been applied only where the de-
fendant has, for his own purpose, created an abnormal risk of harm
to those surrounding him. 96 Examples of such cases involve the
transportation of toxic chemicals and flammable liquids,97 pile
driving that creates excessive vibrations, 98 crop dusting that con-
taminates adjoining crops, 99 use of poisonous gases,'0° deployment
Emerging Theories of Liability and Recovery, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 103, 111
(1990) (stating that strict liability has been rejected in a majority of jurisdictions
when the activity in question is damming water).
95. -See Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395, 397-98 (Cal. 1886) (citing
Rylands and holding a gunpowder blasting defendant liable for damages to
neighboring property). But see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of
Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in
the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 334 n.9 (2000) (taking issue with how juris-
dictions that were said to have rejected the rule in Rylands have been counted).
96. See Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 629-30 (1999)
(arguing the plaintiff who attempts to recover under a strict liability theory must
show evidence that the activity is "abnormally" or "unusually" or "atypically"
dangerous and this requirement is not a prerequisite under a negligence theory);
Robert E. Keeton, Restating Strict Liability and Nuisance, 48 VAND. L. REV.
595, 599 (1995) (explaining how the draft language of the Restatement of Torts
developed factors to be considered when determining if an activity is ultra-
hazardous).
97. See Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 571 S.W.2d 74, 79 (Ark.
1978) (holding that transporting propane gas is an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity). But see Nielsen v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 435, 442 (D. Conn.
1994) (declining to extend strict liability to cases involving underground gaso-
line tanks).
98. See Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 379 (5th Cir.
2001) (listing pile driving as an activity to which strict liability has been ap-
plied); Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Wash. Park Towers, Inc., 569 P.2d 1141, 1143
(Wash. 1977) (applying strict liability for pile driving).
99. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1262 (5th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that crop dusting is an activity that poses such great risks that Louisiana
courts will impose strict liability for the activity); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.,
567 P.2d 218, 220-23 (Wash. 1977) (finding that when injuries result from the
abnormally dangerous activity of crop dusting, strict liability will apply).
100. See Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1948) (enabling plaintiff
who sued after inhaling hydrocyanic acid gas (a poison) to recover under a the-
ory of strict liability); see also Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing
Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO
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of rockets,' 0 ' fireworks displays, 0 2 hazardous waste disposals,1
0 3
drilling for oil,' °4 and, coming back to the starting point of Rylands
v. Fletcher, cases involving injury caused by escaping water.10 5 In
all of these cases, the appropriateness of the dangerous activity to
the surroundings is the controlling issue.' 0 6 Once the court deter-
mines that the act was not in keeping with the surroundings, strict
liability is imposed. 
07
L. REv. 585, 616 (2000) (noting that courts have applied strict liability to in-
stances involving poisonous gases).
101. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967) (applying strict liability for rocket motor testing).
102. See Miller v. Westcor Ltd. P'ship, 831 P.2d 386, 393 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that launching fireworks was an abnormally dangerous activity);
Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991) (finding the factors to
determine an abnormally dangerous activity were present in the context of ignit-
ing fireworks). But see Cadena v. Chi. Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802,
813 (I11. App. Ct. 1998) (applying the same factors, the court determined that
fireworks ignition was not an abnormally dangerous activity).
103. See United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d
318, 320 (D.R.I. 2002) (stating that the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act is a strict liability statute); see also
Kurzyna v. City of New Britain, No. CV0005043885, 2002 WL 1008450, at *8
(Conn. Apr. 1i, 2002) (noting that the disposal of hazardous waste is an abnor-
mally dangerous activity).
104. See Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928)
(holding drillers of oil well strictly liable); see also James R. MacAyeal, The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: The
Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation,
18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217, 274-75 n.300 (2001) (quoting the ration-
ale behind the federal Superfund legislation that referred to the fact that strict
liability is imposed in some states for the practice of oil well drilling).
105. See Beckord v. Dist. Court of Larimer County in Eighth Judicial
Dist., 698 P.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (Colo. 1985) (noting statutory imposition of strict
liability for escaping water); Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197
N.W. 971, 972-73 (Minn. 1924) (stating that the rule in Rylands was applicable
and the city was liable for its water main break).
106. See Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., 399 So. 2d 248, 259 (Ala. 1981)
(Torbert, J., concurring) (noting that appropriateness of the activity to the com-
munity was key to the determination of strict liability, and the storage of water
on a hillside may be an abnormally dangerous activity); Miller v. Civil Con-
structors, 651 N.E.2d 239, 244 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (relying on the fact that, ac-
cording to section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an activity may be
abnormally dangerous because of the circumstances surrounding it).
107. See Matthews v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 770 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir.
1985) (stating that under Louisiana law, one of the determinants of an ultra-
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This position has been adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute.1°8 In section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, six
factors are considered when determining whether or not strict li-
ability is the proper basis of liability. 10 9 From the accompanying
comments, it is clear that not all elements are required, and that,
depending upon the facts in question, some may be more important
than others."10 This means that section 520 should be considered
in its entirety; each segment is a variable unto itself and should be
given importance according to the facts of each individual case.'"
For example, pursuant to the first element, it must be estab-
lished that the activity a high degree of risk to the person, property
or chattels of others.' 2 The first issue, therefore, is whether we
hazardous activity involves a relation to the land); James R. Zazzali & Frank P.
Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL L. REV.
446, 462 (1983) (stating that among the factors to be balanced in determining
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities are the utility of the activity
and how appropriate the activity is to the locale).
108. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Prod-
uct Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 967 (2002)
(stating that the American Law Institute included the strict liability rule for ab-
normally dangerous activities in its 1965 publication of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts); Kenneth P. Dobson, Methods and Motives for Imposing Strict
Liability on Parties Hiring Independent Contractors to Transport Hazardous
Materials in the State of Florida, 24 VT. L. REv. 1297, 1299 (2000) (stating that
the American Law Institute added to its draft Restatement in 1964 a provision
concerning strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
110. Id. cmt. f (asserting that no one factor is "necessarily sufficient of
itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for
strict liability").
111. See Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DtEGo L. REv. 597, 621 (1999) (de-
scribing each of the factors used to determine an abnormally dangerous activity
as important to the analysis); Matthew Pontillo, Suing Gun Manufacturers: A
Shot in the Dark, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1167, 1177 (2000) (listing the six fac-
tors to determine an ultra-hazardous activity and describing them all as relevant
to the determination).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (setting forth as the
first element: "existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others"). But see William W. Watts, Common Law Remedies
in Alabama for Contamination of Land, 29 CUMBERLAND L. REv. 37, 54 (1998-
99) (stating that all the factors listed in section 520 are somewhat open ended in
nature).
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have conduct wherein injury is likely." 3 By definition, this ques-
tion would eliminate any undertaking that the court would consider
as not being ultra hazardous, and, by virtue of the remaining sec-
tions, this would depend in large part upon the location in-
volved.1 4 Next, section 520 attempts to determine whether the
gravity of the potential harm is likely to be great.' 15 Apparently, at
this juncture, we bring into play the risk-benefit analysis that has
been the hallmark of actionable negligence: PL (G) > B = N.
116
According to this formula, we take the probability of loss (PL), and
multiply it by the gravity of the foreseeable harm (G). 7 This sum
113. See Mark Gistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of
Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611,
648 (1998) (suggesting that the Restatement factors really mean that the injury
costs of an activity exceed their utility); Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fair-
ness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH L. REV. 1266, 1308 (1997)
(asserting that in order to spread losses "at an optimal level, under any form of
strict liability, damages should be awarded at the deterrence level for negligently
inflicted harms").
114. See Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409, 414
(5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the appropriateness of the activity to the location
is generally a requirement for most courts in the determination of the appli-
cability of strict liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g
(1977) (setting forth the following: "In determining whether there is such a
major risk, it may therefore be necessary to take into account the place
where the activity is conducted .... ").
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(b) (1977) (inquiring
whether the "likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great");
Mary Margaret McEachern, Inherently Dangerous or Inherently Difficult?
Interpretations and Criticisms of Imposing Vicarious Liability on General
Contractors for Injuries Suffered as a Result of Independent Contractors:
Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Company, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 483, 490
n.51 (1995) (stating that an abnormally dangerous activity is one in which
great harm is likely).
116. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (setting forth the famous formula penned by Judge Learned Hand
for determining negligence); see also A. Bryan Endres, GMO: Genetically
Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The Liability
Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union, 22
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 488 (2000) (asserting that the
evaluation of Restatement section 520, factors (a), (b), (c) and (f), parallels a
negligence analysis).
117. See Grimes v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (summarizing Hand's algebraic negligence formula); Cross
v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 936 n.3 (Wyo. 2000) (restating the negli-
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is weighed against the burden of eliminating or at least reducing
the risk (B).'' 8 Ultimately, the end result is a negligent defendant
when the burden is less than the total of the first two variables, and
conversely, a non-negligent defendant in cases wherein B is greater
than the total of the other two.' 19 It is interesting to note at this
point that while we are concerned with the issue of strict liability,
the first part of section 520 is expressed in terms that sound in neg-
ligence. 120 This is made clearer by the third element which asks
whether the risk can be eliminated by exercising reasonable
care. 12 1
To this point, the provisions of section 520 do not appear in-
dicative of strict liability. 122 It is, however, at this juncture that the
gence formula as follows: "tortfeasor is liable if the cost of reasonable pre-
cautions (B) is less than the product of the probability of injury (P) and the
magnitude of potential loss (L). (B < PL)"); Gina M. DeDominicis, Note, No
Duty at Any Speed?: Determining the Responsibility of the Automobile
Manufacturer in Speed-Related Accidents, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 405-06
n. Il (1986) (summarizing that a negligence finding begins with multiplying
the probability of a loss times the gravity of the injury).
118. See Reardon v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 26 F.3d 52, 53 (7th
Cir. 1994) (showing that the negligence formula holds that the burden of
precautions and the loss if there is an accident must be measured against an
accident's probability if the precautions are not taken).
119. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba,
683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982) (showing that a tortfeasor is negligent if
the burden of reducing the risk is less than the probability of the loss); see
also Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 572 n.10
(Wyo. 1992) (summarizing the negligence mathematical formula).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977)
(showing that there is an allowance for both a negligence analysis and a
strict liability analysis to ultra-hazardous activities); see also Fletcher v.
Conoco Pipe Line Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (W.D. Mont. 2001) (stat-
ing that for many courts, the analysis for a strict liability situation revolves
around whether or not the safety of an activity can be increased through the
exercise of ordinary care).
121. See Ind. Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174,
1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that any analysis of an activity for imposing
strict liability might start with the exercise of due care); Chaveriat v. Wil-
liams Pipe Line Co., 1994 WL 583598, at *5 (N.D. 111. Oct. 18, 1994) (stat-
ing that the third factor of section 520-reasonable care to reduce the risk of
harm-deserves primary attention).
122. See Yukon Equip. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206,
1209-11 (Ala. 1978) (declining to accept the Restatement's section 520 ap-
proach because it was too similar to the negligence analysis).
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Restatement brings to life the principles of Rylands v. Fletcher. 
123
The Lord Chancellor's reasoning is echoed by the fourth factor
which asks whether the activity is a common one, and Ryland's
resurrection is further amplified by the fifth factor, which seeks to
determine whether the activity is in fact appropriate to its loca-
tion. 124 Section 520, therefore, makes it clear that judgment will be
rendered in light of two principle issues: activities which are or are
not appropriate to the area, and which may or may not be a matter
of common acceptance. 125 These questions will be considered on a
case by case basis. 126 If both elements are present, strict liability is
likely to result.1
27
Finally, the last section weighs the value of the activity to the
community.128 If the locale does not benefit economically, or if
123. See Boston, supra note 96, at 599 (arguing that some "tinkering"
is necessary with the Restatement in order to recapture the Rylands origins
of strict liability theory).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977); see
also C. Conrad Claus, Oregon's Development of Absolute Liability under the
Rylands Doctrine: A Case Study, 53 WASH. U. J. URB & CONTEMP. L. 171,
183 n.79 (1998) (explaining the development of the Rylands development
and noting both the fourth and fifth elements in the Restatement). The draft-
ers of the Restatement seem to have considered Lord Chancellor's state-
ments because they discussed water collection in reservoirs in coal mining
territory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i.
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e) (listing as a con-
sideration the "inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is car-
ried on"); Michael J. Maher & Sheila Horan, Lessons in L.U.S.T.: The Com-
plete Story of Liability for Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 16 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 581, 605 (1996) (summarizing the importance of location to the
strict liability analysis).
126. See Bowen Eng'g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467, 481
(D.N.J. 1992) (stating that the six factors should be applied on a case by case
basis); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1259 (N.J.
1991) (determining that activities may be classified as abnormally dangerous
on a case-by-case basis).
127. See William E. Westerbeke & Reginald L. Robinson, Survey of
Kansas Tort Law, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1057 n.258, 260 (1989) (stating
that strict liability is appropriate when factors (d) and (e) are present); see
also State Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 159 (N.J.
1983) (applying the six factors to toxic waste and finding it abnormally dan-
gerous and subject to strict liability).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1977) (setting
forth the final factor as the "extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes"); see also Cadena v. Chi. Fireworks
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the activity is against public policy, chances are good that strict
liability will be applied. 1
29
In summary we can say that if section 520 is representative of
the American position in matters involving ultra-hazardous activi-
ties, it becomes clear, regardless of some latent ambiguities result-
ing from the language used, that strict liability will result from in-
juries caused by such activities. 130 This is true when it appears that
the activity is inappropriate to the area, poses great risk of harm to
others, and has no particular redeeming economic value to the
community.13 1 Ultimately, we weigh the risk of harm resulting
from the behavior against its appropriateness to the surrounding
area. 132
Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 814 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that the court
determined, due to the fact of the general public enjoyment of fireworks
displays on July 4, that fireworks are of some social utility and, therefore,
subparagraph (f) is not met).
129. See Stephen Kelly Lewis, Comment, "Attack of the Killer Toma-
toes?" Corporate Liability for the International Propagation of Genetically
Altered Agricultural Products, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 153, 187-88 (1997)
(positing that a strict liability finding for an ultra-hazardous activity is
rooted in economics as well as public policy).
130. See Correa v. Curbey, 605 P.2d 458, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(relying upon the majority view which follows the Restatement section 520
factors to determine that use of explosives is an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity); Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (standing for the proposition that strict liability, in most cases, will be
imposed for abnormally dangerous activities where no amount of care can
make the activity more safe).
131. See Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 868 (Minn.
1984) (reasoning that dangerous activities may be of such value to a com-
munity that holding an actor strictly liable for damages flowing from the
activity without regard to fault would not be appropriate because the com-
munity would lose the benefit of the activity); Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722
A.2d 1103, 1107 (Pa. 1998) (finding that the location of underground stor-
age tanks was appropriate to the community and therefore, there was no
strict liability).
132. See Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387,
391 (E.D. Va. 1991) (stating the more appropriate an activity is to its setting,
the less likely it is to be considered abnormally dangerous); Clark-Aiken Co.
v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 887 (Mass. 1975) (stating that the
essential question is whether the risk's magnitude or the circumstances sur-
rounding the risk justify the imposition of strict liability).
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IV. NUISANCE
The law with regard to strict liability in nuisance is closely
aligned to that of ultra-hazardous activities.' 33 Before making the
comparison, however, there are four features concerning nuisance
that should be emphasized. 34 The first is that when we speak of
nuisance, we are not referring to a specific tort. 135 Instead, we are
referring to an entire field of law.' At one end of the spectrum
we have what is generally referred to as a private nuisance which
would involve any activity that unreasonably interferes with the
use and enjoyment of one's land, 37 whether noise, vibration, light,
or any other interference with rightful use of the land would qual-
ify. 138 At the other end, we have what is referred to as a public
nuisance. 139 Generally, this would include minor criminal offenses
133. See Keith N. Hilton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2001) (stating that
strict liability for ultrahazardous activities and nuisance are closely related);
see also Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating that nuisance and strict liability are common law
derivatives of trespass doctrine).
134. See Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 404 A.2d 889, 891
(Conn. 1978) (setting forth the elements of a nuisance cause of action);
Murphy v. Bradlees, Inc., 1994 WL 684683, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
30, 1994) (mem.) (providing a summary of a typical nuisance case).
135. See Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1158
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (describing either a public or a private nuisance as an
entire field of liability); see also WADE ET AL., supra note 78, at 802 (ex-
plaining that nuisance is an entire field of liability).
136. See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504 (Tex. 1997)
(quoting Prosser and declaring nuisance a field of liability and a kind of
damage done); Loyd v. ECO Resources, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 125 (Tex.
App. 1997) (stating that a nuisance is a condition that interferes with an-
other's rights).
137. See Pestey v. Cushman, 788 A.2d 496, 502 (Conn. 2002) (stating
that private nuisance involves the interference with an individual's right to
use and enjoy her land); Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d
1053, 1064-65 (Mass. 2002) (comparing and contrasting the difference be-
tween a private and public nuisance).
138. See Gainsville, H. & W. R. Co. v. Hall, 14 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex.
1890) (stating that a nuisance can arise from a business's "noise, smoke and
vibration"); City of Temple v. Mitchell, 180 S.W.2d 959, 962 (Tex. App.
1944) (stating that had the enterprise been a private one, the offensive smells
produced would have constituted a nuisance).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (providing
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that would interfere with the public's comfort, convenience, health,
safety, morals or peace. 140 The only similarity between the two is
that both incorporate the word nuisance; in reality they have no
connection to one another. 141 One is a tort with principles based
upon the common law, and the other is, as noted, generally based
upon some sort of penal provision. 142
Second, both may be classified as either temporary or perma-
nent.143  What distinguishes one from the other is the cost of
abatement.14 If the cost of abolishing the activity is relatively lit-
tle, it will be designated as a temporary nuisance whereas if the
cost is relatively prohibitive, it will be referred to as permanent. 1
45
a definition of public nuisance); see also Fevold v. Board of Sup'rs, 210
N.W. 139, 144 (Iowa 1926) (finding a public nuisance for the keeping of
diseased cattle).
140. See Wallace v. Horn, 506 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Tex. App. 1974) (stat-
ing that a public nuisance is an act or condition that subverts the public order
or that constitutes an interference with public rights); see also Treadgill v.
State, 275 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Tex. App. 1954) (stating that fireworks are a
public nuisance).
141. See Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law
and the Prevention of Genetic Pollution: Declining a Dinner Date with Da-
mocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328 (2000) (noting that although there may be
some overlap, public nuisance and private nuisance are two distinct tort
remedies). But see Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood
Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years
after Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 361 (1990) (standing for the proposition
that although "the differences between thelse] two bodies of law" continue
to be important in contemporary jurisprudence, and particularly in such areas
as environmental law, the division between the two is disappearing).
142. See WADE ET AL., supra note 78, at 802 (explaining that in order
to entitle one to relief in tort for a public nuisance, the complained of act has
traditionally been required to also be a crime); Abrams & Washington, supra
note 141, at 362 (noting that public nuisance was originally criminal in na-
ture).
143. See State ex rel. Smith v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co.,
488 S.E.2d 901, 923 n.26 (W. Va. 1997) (noting there are several tests for
determining permanent and temporary nuisances); see also Taygeta Corp. v.
Varian Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 2002) (stating that a
continuing trespass may cause permanent harm, temporary harm or both).
144. See State ex rel. Smith, 488 S.E.2d at 923 n.26 (citing 58 AM. JUR.
2D Nuisances § 30 (1989) for the "ability to abate" test).
145. See Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 404 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Md. 1979) (permanent damages are only available if the nuisance is perma-
nent); see also Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1996)
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Third, in both instances, an injured plaintiff may be entitled to
remedies in law or in equity depending upon the type of injury in-
volved. 14 6 The only requirement for an individual bringing suit in
the area of public nuisance, however, is that the plaintiff must suf-
fer an injury different in kind rather than degree from the rest of
the public.
1 47
The fourth feature concerning nuisance is that the basis of li-
ability in both instances may be either the defendant's fault (i.e.,
intent or negligence), or strict liability. 14  In this instance, strict
liability would be invoked where the defendant undertook an ultra-
hazardous activity as described in the preceding section. t 9 If the
court determines that a nuisance-either public or private--exists
(stating that the test for temporary or permanent nuisances is whether the
action can be remedied at a reasonable expense); Hall v. Lovell Regency
Homes Ltd. P'ship, 708 A.2d 344, 355 (Md. 1998) (describing the elements
for damages in a temporary nuisance claim).
146. See Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regu-
lations?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 427, 442 (2002) (stating that public nuisance
remedies include injunction and damages); Jerome M. Organ & Kristin M.
Perry, Controlling Externalities Associated with Concentrated Animal Feed-
ing Operations: Evaluating the Impact of H.B. 1207 and the Continuing
Viability of Zoning and the Common Law of Nuisance, 3 Mo. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 183, 194 (1996) (stating that courts can grant damages and/or
injunctions as remedies for private nuisances).
147. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Of Time and Feedlots: The Effect
of Spur Industries on Nuisance Law, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
75, 77 (1992) (stating that in order for the plaintiff to recover special dam-
ages, the injured party must show his damages were not the same as those
suffered by the general public); see also Adams v. Comm'rs of Trappe, 102
A.2d 830, 834 (Md. 1954) (distinguishing between private nuisance and
public nuisance).
148. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing that strict liability is one basis of liability in a nuisance action); Louise
A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89,
100 n.60 (1998) (noting the strict liability history of nuisance).
149. See Peter B. Kutner, The End of Rylands v. Fletcher? 31 Cam-
bridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather PLC, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 73,
95 (1995) (noting that Prosser and other authorities required an underlying
basis of liability for recovery under a private nuisance action and one basis
was strict liability predicated upon an ultra-hazardous activity); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 17, 24 (1998) (noting that for many torts as well, such as nuisance
and defamation, the common law has permitted a range of liability without
fault).
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and that it also qualifies as an ultra-hazardous activity, strict liabil-
ity will follow.150 The reasoning is the same. All elements of sec-
tion 520 as previously discussed would come into play.'
5 1
V. MISREPRESENTATION
Misrepresentation, like nuisance, does not represent a particu-
lar tort, but instead an entire field of law.' 52 In this instance, a
cause of action would arise whenever one makes a statement as to
a material fact that is untrue upon which another reasonably relies
to her detriment.' 53 An injured plaintiff in these cases may elect to
bring suit in a variety of ways.1 54 First, she may elect a remedy at
150. See Highview N. Apartments v. Ramsey County, 323 N.W.2d 65,
71 (Minn. 1982) (stating that nuisance requires some type of wrongful con-
duct which may be either intentional conduct, ultra-hazardous activity, neg-
ligence, violation of a statute or some other tort).
151. See State Dept. of Envt'l. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150,
159 (N.J. 1983) (holding that mercury dumping is an activity that is abnor-
mally dangerous and carries strict liability for any damages that result and
following the Restatement's section 520 guidelines in making the determina-
tion of what is abnormally dangerous activity); Copart Indus., Inc. v. Con-
solidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (N.Y. 1977) (de-
claring that courts recognize that an individual is liable under a private nui-
sance theory if her conduct is a legal cause of the invasion of another's in-
terest in the private use and enjoyment of land and the invasion is (I) unrea-
sonable and intentional, (2) reckless or negligent, or (3) actionable under the
rules for abnormally dangerous activities or conditions).
152. See Riley Hill Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595,
604 (Or. 1987) (quoting Prosser to describe misrepresentation as considera-
bly broader than the action for deceit and noting that several theories of li-
ability in this area of tort law overlap). Cf Babb v. Bolyard, 72 A.2d 13, 16
(Md. 1950) (noting that some courts have expanded the action for deceit to
encompass more than fraud and negligent misrepresentation).
153. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contrac-
tors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (stating that an actionable claim
for fraud requires the plaintiff to establish that "(1) a material misrepresenta-
tion was made, (2) the speaker knew it was false when made or made it reck-
lessly without any knowledge of its truth, (3) the representation was made
with the intent that it should be acted upon by the party, and (4) the party
acted in reliance upon the representation to its damage"); see also Jackson v.
W. Telemarketing Corp. Outbound, 245 F.3d 518, 525 (5th Cir. 2001) (re-
stating the elements for fraud).
154. See WADE ET AL., supra note 78, at 1010 (setting forth "numerous
alternative remedies" for misrepresentation).
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law.155 This would offer three vehicles of recovery.156 The plain-
tiff may elect to bring suit on the basis of breach of contract, argu-
ing that she had not received that for which she bargained.157 In
the alternative, the plaintiff could seek restitution electing to bring
suit on the basis of quasi-contract so as to avoid any unjust en-
richment on the part of the defendant. '58 Finally, the plaintiff may
allege a cause of action in tort, which would require an additional
choice. 159 The basis of liability could be that the defendant acted
intentionally, in which case the proper cause of action would be
deceit requiring the plaintiff to establish fraud. 16° This would re-
155. See Kahin v. Lewis, 259 P.2d 420, 423 (Wash. 1953) (showing
that with an election, plaintiff may have a remedy at law with a misrepresen-
tation); see also Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat. Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537,
541 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff ultimately had no cause of action
for fraudulent misrepresentation as a matter of law).
156. See WADE ET AL., supra note 78, at 1010 (relating the three vehi-
cles of recovery where the plaintiff has elected a remedy at law: breach of
contract, restitution, and the tort action of deceit).
157. See Derry v. Peek, 13 App. Cas. House of Lords 337 (1889) (dis-
tinguishing between actions for rescission of a contract based on misrepre-
sentations of material fact and actions for deceit); see also Sibley v. South-
land Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1931) (stating that a defen-
dant's liability in an action for deceit is held not to be affected by the fact
that a false promise was made orally, the action being in tort and not in con-
tract).
158. Ross v. Harding, 391 P.2d 526, 532 (Wash. 1964) (stating that ab-
sent fraud, a misrepresentation that is admitted would at the very least nec-
essarily be characterized as a mutual mistake and a clear bona fide mutual
mistake concerning material facts allows a court in equity to grant a rescis-
sion); see also Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach & Co., 159 N.E. 700,
702 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that rescission may be had on a contract for misrep-
resentation).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977) (delineating
conditions that would cause a misrepresentation to be fraudulent); T.O.
Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. 1992) (set-
ting forth the elements to recover for fraud).
160. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs and Contractors,
Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (stating that a showing of fraud requires
a material misrepresentation that was false, the defendant's knowledge of its
falsity when it was made or uncertainty of its truth, intent that the statement
be acted upon, and reliance by the plaintiff, which caused the plaintiff's
injury); see also Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc.,
962 S.W.2d 507, 526-27 (Tex. 1998) (setting forth common law fraud ele-
ments).
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quire the plaintiff to show that the defendant made the statement
knowing it was false or with careless disregard as to whether it was
true or not.' 6' In the alternative, the plaintiff could allege negligent
misrepresentation and, in this instance, the elements of actionable
negligence would come into play: duty, breach of duty, proximate
cause and injury. 162 If any of these three causes of action at law-
contract, quasi contract or tort--do not offer the plaintiff an ade-
quate remedy, in that money fails to make the plaintiff whole, the
injured party would be able to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of
the court and recover accordingly.' 
63
Tort is an interesting cause of action. As mentioned above,
the basis of liability would be that the defendant acted intention-
ally, or failed to act as a reasonable and prudent person under like
or similar circumstances. There are, however, some scenarios
wherein strict liability would be proper. 64 If it is established that
161. Hamad v. Tex. State Teacher's Ass'n, No. 03-01-00360-CV, 2001
WL 1627937, at *3 (Tex. App. Dec. 20, 2001) (stating that in order to estab-
lish fraud, the plaintiff must show in part that the defendant made the state-
ment, knowing it was false or made it recklessly); see also Trenholm v.
Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983) (stating that fraud may be consti-
tuted by an opinion if the maker of the statement has knowledge of its fal-
sity).
162. See Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439,
442 (Tex. 1991) (describing how a claim for negligent misrepresentation
requires a duty to exercise reasonable care, a breach of that duty, causation
and damages); Key v. Pierce, 8 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating
that because there was no evidence to show that the maker of the statement
failed to exercise ordinary care, the negligent misrepresentation claim must
fail).
163. Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 82 S.W.3d 40, 43 (Tex. App.
2002) (noting that in some cases where there has been a misrepresentation, a
court in equity can impose a constructive trust over property); see also In re
Marriage of Loftis, 40 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting that where
property has been obtained through a misrepresentation, the court can use
the equitable remedy of a constructive trust).
164. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 58
(S.D. Ohio 1986) (standing for the proposition that while the Ohio courts
have considered the tort of innocent misrepresentation and situations
wherein strict liability will be imposed, the court rejected its application in
this case involving misrepresentations concerning whether a nuclear reactor
would meet federal standards); see also Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting statutory provisions that impose strict liability for
misrepresentations made by accountants).
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the defendant did not act intentionally or negligently, then by defi-
nition, we would have an innocent misrepresentation. There is
ample authority for the proposition that an injured plaintiff in this
type of scenario should still be offered relief.165 This, by necessity,
results in the application of strict liability.166 In these cases, there
appears to be a deliberate policy on the part of the courts to place
the resulting loss upon the innocent defendant rather than upon the
innocent plaintiff.167 This is especially true in cases wherein the
defendant purports to have knowledge concerning the matter in
question. 6  The classic example would be a cause of action
wherein the defendant, when inducing a sale, makes representa-
tions concerning the quality of goods. 169 This doctrine of fairness
165. Gibson v. Capano, 699 A.2d 68, 71 (Conn. 1997) (stating that
Connecticut recognizes a cause of action for innocent misrepresentation);
see also Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (stating
that a broker can be strictly liable for assertions about a home).
166. See Gauerke v. Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804, 807 n.3 (Wis. 1983)
(stating that under Wisconsin law, misrepresentations that impose strict li-
ability occur when the defendant has personal knowledge or the situation is
such that he necessarily ought to have known what was true or false
concerning the statement and, furthermore, the defendant must have an
interest of an economic nature in the transaction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
167. Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 22 N.E. 139, 140 (Ind. 1889) (stating that if
a speaker makes an untrue statement that is relied upon, the fact that the
speaker subjectively believed the statement to be true does not relieve him of
liability); see also Essenburg v. Russell, 78 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Mich. 1956)
(stating that even if the maker of a statement does not know it is false when
he makes it, if the person to whom it is made relies upon it to his detriment,
the plaintiff could exercise a cause of action for damages either at law or in
equity).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. a (1977) (dis-
cussing how courts have used the language of scienter, but have imposed
strict liability for innocent misrepresentations nonetheless); see also Horton
v. Tyree, 139 S.E. 737, 738 (W. Va. 1927) (stating that some sellers are un-
der a duty to know, and if they give erroneous information without knowl-
edge on the subject, they are liable in law just as if their falsehood had been
intentional).
169. Johnson v. Healy, 405 A.2d 54, 56 (Conn. 1978) (relating that im-
position of strict liability on sellers who make innocent misrepresentations
in the sale of goods is a well established principle in Connecticut law); see
also Graves v. Haynes, 231 S.W. 383, 385 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921) (stat-
ing that even if the seller had the belief that his cows were safe, sound, and
free from tick-induced fevers, that fact was not important if the buyer took
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upon which the basis of liability is justified is the same as that
adopted by the American Law Institute in section 552C of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.'70 The only difference is that the sec-
tion does not limit its application to the sale of goods, but is ex-
tended to the rental or exchange of goods as well. 17'
Before leaving this topic, it should be noted that currently, the
law of sales is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code which
has been in force since the mid 1960s.172 Its predecessor, the Uni-
form Sales Act, which was enacted around the turn of the last cen-
tury, fulfilled the same purpose. 173 Much has been written of these
statutes and they need not be explored here. What is important
however, is that both authorities, in codifying the law, apparently
took note of the fact that warranties, expressed as well as implied,
could be traced to the common law action of deceit. 74  Strict
liability as expressed by the law of warranty, therefore, is yet an-
the representations as fact and relied upon those statements in purchasing the
cattle).
170. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (a) (1977)
(stating that section 552C is a strict liability rule pertaining to innocent mis-
representations of material facts made during the course of a sale, rental or
exchange transaction), with Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F.
Supp. 1259, 1264 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating the theory of innocent misrepre-
sentation in Massachusetts has only been applicable in the context of dis-
agreements between buyers and sellers of commodities).
171. Gibson v. Capano, 699 A.2d 68, 71 (Conn. 1997) (quoting the Re-
statement and stating that claims of innocent misrepresentations in Con-
necticut are not confined to the sale of goods); see also Richard v. A.
Waldman & Sons, Inc., 232 A.2d 307, 310 (Conn. 1967) (stating that the
home purchaser had relied upon misrepresentations that were in the nature of
a warranty and the purchaser could recover under contract law for a breach
of warranty).
172. See generally ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
SALES (1970); see also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG,
SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, RESTATEMENT
SECOND, UN SALES CONVENTION, UNIDROIT FORMS, FORMS (1998).
173. See NORDSTROM, supra note 172, at 4 (stating that many of the
ideas contained in the Uniform Sales Act were reproduced in Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code).
174. See Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theo-
ries to Service Transactions, 47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 233 (quoting I ORA F.
HARRIS, JR. & ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTE, WARRANTY LAW IN TORT AND
CONTRACT ACTIONS § 2.5 (1989)) ("Professors Harris and Squillante state
that '[bireach of warranty is derived from the tort of deceit."').
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other example of how strict liability is applied, although in a de-
rivative manner, in the area of misrepresentation. 1
75
VI. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Whether referred to as respondeat superior or vicarious liabil-
ity, in this area of the law we are speaking in terms of imputed
negligence. 176 One is going to be held responsible for the wrong-
doing of another. 177 This is the purest example of strict liability in
that one who is totally innocent of any fault whatsoever will be
held liable. 178 The scenario usually arises in employment situa-
tions where, assuming the employee is engaged in a task that is
furthering the business of his employer, the latter will be forced to
compensate any injured party for any tort sustained. 179 This rea-
175. See John J. Kropp et al., Horse Sense and the UCC: The Purchase
of Racehorses, I MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 171, 186 n.92 (1991) (stating that strict
liability in one form is found in the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose); John W. Wade, Strict Product Liability: A Look at Its Evolu-
tion, 19 THE BRIEF 8, 8-11 (1989) (explaining that while negligence liability
in the context of dangerous products underwent an evolution, at the same
time, implied warranties of fitness and merchantability were a form of strict
liability).
176. Marange v. Marshall, 402 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. App. 1966.)
(stating that the doctrine of respondeat superior is a recognized legal fiction
that a master should answer for the acts of his servant); see also Lundberg v.
State, 255 N.E.2d 177, 179 (N.Y. 1969) (explaining the doctrine of respon-
deat superior where an employer will be liable for his employee's negli-
gence).
177. Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569
(Tex. 1972) (stating that an employer will be held liable for his employee's
negligent actions if those actions are within the scope of the employee's
general authority); see also Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 138 (Alaska
1972) (stating that respondeat superior means "let the employer answer").
178. Med. Slenderizing, Inc. v. State, 579 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tex. App.
1979) (stating that although employer did not have knowledge thereof or had
not forbidden the employee's conduct, the employer would be held liable for
his employee's wrongs if those wrongs were done while the employee was
acting in the business of his employer and were within the scope of his em-
ployment).
179. Mosqueda v. Albright Transfer & Storage Co., 320 S.W.2d 867,
870 (Tex. App. 1958) (stating that actions of servants acting outside the
scope of their employment will not impose liability on their employers under
the doctrine of respondeat superior until the employee is on the job and
within limits encompassing his employment and that the employee's state of
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soning, as in the case of animals discussed above, has its origins in
the earliest forms of our Anglo-American jurisprudence, and has
been consistently applied. 1
80
The justification for this form of liability has many variations.
First is the element of control.18' If a master controls or at least
has the right of controlling his servant, the prevailing thought is
that he should be held accountable for any resulting injury. 182 In
addition to the element of control, there is the thought that an em-
ployer, especially in the case of a going enterprise, has the deepest
pocket.183 Therefore, it would be most equitable to compensate the
mind does not determine entry into his scope of employment); see also
Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that
the line between what makes one a "servant" for the purposes of vicarious
liability and what makes one an "independent contractor" is not clearly
drawn).
180. Douglas McGhee, Comment, Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: The Min-
nesota Court of Appeals Limits the Recovery of Sex Abuse Victims in
Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 15 LAW & INEQ. 191, 200 (1997) (noting that
legal historians do not agree on the origins of respondeat superior but it is
plausible that it could date from the era of the Roman Empire); see also John
Dwight Ingram, Vicarious Liability of an Employer-Master: Must There Be
a Right of Control?, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 93, 94 (1995) (stating that
Holmes traced the theory of vicarious liability back to Roman Law and
Wigmore thought its origins were probably Germanic).
181. Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined:
Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by
their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1518 n.24 (1992) (noting the his-
torical justifications for the doctrine of respondeat superior are numerous
and one example of a justification concerns the notion of an employer's
"control" over his employee's conduct); see also Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys.
v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998) (stating that the "right of
control" is a justification for imposing vicarious liability on an employer
because the employer controls the means of work).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958) (noting
that since the master has control over the servant's activities, the idea fol-
lows that responsibility for the damage done by the servant's activities
should lie with the master); see also Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d
582, 589 (Tex. 1964) (stating that essentially, vicarious liability is a policy
doctrine based in contract, either expressed or implied, vesting the employer
with the right to control the work details).
183. John L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts of its Franchi-
sees: The Case for Substituting Liability as a Guarantor for the Current
Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 17 n.24 (1999) (noting that
the most convincing of the explanations for vicarious liability is probably
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innocent injured plaintiff first, and then leave the employer to at-
tempt to recoup any loss from the wrongdoing employee. 184 An-
other reason for this form of liability is based upon public policy,
or economically speaking, allocation of risk. 185 A business enter-
prise should pay.' 86 Such a concern is better able to absorb the
cost, and in turn obtain insurance against such loss and shift the
burden to their customers.187 As an added bonus, strict liability in
these cases will encourage an employer to exercise more care when
selecting his employees.' 88 These reasons have been given in a
satisfaction, wherein the employee usually cannot compensate the injured
party but the master or employer usually does have the ability to pay dam-
ages); see also Richard Fossey & Todd A. DeMitchell, "Let the Master An-
swer": Holding Schools Vicariously Liable when Employees Sexually Abuse
Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575, 578 (1996) (noting that a justification for
vicarious liability is that enterprises that benefit from their people acting
properly most of the time should be forced to pay when an employee acts
improperly and causes injuries).
184. For a related justification, see Fossey & Demitchell, supra note
183, at 579 (stating that another reason for imposing vicarious liability on
employers is that they have the ability to procure insurance); see also
WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964) (pro-
viding a history and the justifications for respondeat superior).
185. Abramson v. Reiss, 638 A.2d 743, 750 (Md. 1994) (stating that
"respondeat superior is essentially a public policy doctrine"); see also Ed-
wards v. Silva, 32 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that an em-
ployer is under a duty to prevent those who work for him from causing risks
that are unreasonable to others).
186. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 124, at 915-16 (5th ed. 1984); Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking
Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-The Traps of Limited
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 746 (1997) (stating that
"vicarious liability deliberately allocates risk to the principal as a cost of
doing business through agents as a policy rule").
187. See Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old
Bottle: A Recommendation for Determining Liability of an Employer under
Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 575 n.40 (1994) (noting several
authorities who have written on the issue of the economic underpinnings of
imposing vicarious liability in the business context).
188. See Fossey & Demitchell, supra note 183, at 579 (stating that the
rule of vicarious liability fosters safety); Scott J. Hyman, Far West Financial
Corp. v. D&S Co. and the Abolition of Total Equitable Indemnity: What a
Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 21 PACIFIC L.J. 147, 183 n.242 (1989) (noting
that greater safety is a policy reason behind strict products liability and that
there is a close parallel in policy behind vicarious liability).
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variety of combinations, but the result is the same-vicarious li-
ability imposes the risk of loss upon one who did not act, was not
present, and in many cases did not know of the injury until after
the fact.' 89 This is an excellent example of strict liability.
There are exceptions to this general rule. Vicarious liability
will not apply when speaking in terms of independent contractors
who the employer have no right of control,19° or scenarios where
the employee is on "a frolic of his own" and he is not in the act of
furthering his employer's business, 191 or instances where the ser-
vant has inflicted an intentional tort for no reason other than to
vent his own anger; 192 but these need not be discussed at this point.
Of interest to this discussion is the application of strict liability in a
situation involving one who is acting on behalf of another.' 93 In
189. See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 62
(1941) (stating that since vicarious liability imposes liability without any
negligence or fault on the part of the employer, it is a form of strict liabil-
ity); see also J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 341 (1995) (noting that strict vicarious liabil-
ity has aspects in common with other strict liability forms).
190. Espalin v. Children's Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 683
(Tex. App. 2000) (stating that independent contractors' actions will not gen-
erally impose vicarious liability on the individuals who contracted with
them).
191. In re Centennial Techs. Litig., 52 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184 (D. Mass.
1999) (noting that in a situation where an employee who is on a frolic of his
own and commits an act that injures another, vicarious liability will not at-
tach on the employer); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235
(1958).
192. Davis v. U.S. Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ing that under traditional vicarious liability doctrine as applied in South
Carolina, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the intentional
torts of its employees); see also Luttrell v. O'Connor Chevrolet, Inc., No. 01
C 979, 2001 WL 1105125, at *4 (N.D. I11. Sept. 19, 2001) (stating that sex-
ual assault had not been shown to be in any way connected to the em-
ployee's scope of employment and therefore the employer could not be vi-
cariously liable).
193. See Ex parte Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 815 So.
2d 558, 561 (Ala. 2001) (stating that if an employee is not acting on behalf
of his employer, vicarious liability will not attach); see also Alexander v.
Fujitsu Bus. Communication Syst., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 462, 468 (D.N.H.
1993) (ruling that where the plaintiff has alleged that certain individuals
were acting on behalf of their employer, the plaintiff had successfully stated
a claim to hold the employer vicariously liable).
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this instance the justifications for liability differ from those dis-
cussed previously and are mentioned for that specific purpose.
VII. DEFAMATION
Defamation consists of two torts: libel and slander.' 94 The
distinction between the two can at times be difficult to make, but
for all practical purposes libel is concerned with the printed word
and slander with that which is spoken.' 95 Both causes of action are
intended to protect an individual's good name, reputation or stand-
ing in her community (the tort is usually defined as a communica-
tion which holds the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or
causes her to be shunned or avoided), and both can be traced to the
very earliest stages of development in our Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence. 96 In fact, their lineage goes back to the time
when ecclesiastical courts were in full power and defamation at the
time was treated as a sin punishable with proper penance.' 97 As
194. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007 n.12 (Utah
1994) (noting that the term "defamation" can mean either libel or slander
and the main distinction between the two is the form of the publication); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (distinguishing be-
tween libel and slander).
195. Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188, 193-94 (8th Cir. 1962) (noting
the traditional common law definition of slander and the statutory definition
of libel which includes printing of the defamatory statement); see also
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 443 (Conn.
1955) (noting that the root of the distinction between slander and libel is the
form of publication such as "the written or printed word or passage").
196. Graves v. Iowa Lakes Cmty. Coll., 639 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa
2002) (stating that words that are spoken are actionable as slander if they
cause injury to a person's good name); see also Jefferson County Sch. Dist.
No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir.
1999) (stating that slander protects the interest an individual has in his or her
good name, offering a cause of action for an injury to the person's reputation
caused by false statements).
197. Bonnie Docherty, Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 263, 265 (2000) (noting the history of defamation and
how a cause of action for publication of the insult developed out of the Eng-
lish ecclesiastical courts' inability to deal with defamation satisfactorily);
see also Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1377
(2001) (noting that the law of defamation has taken many forms and has
been adjudicated in several different fora, including ecclesiastical courts).
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the common law courts came into their own, the cause of action
was shifted to their jurisdiction and current rules were formulated
at that time.' 98
Today, there are special constitutional questions regarding
free speech that bring into play issues with regard to public offi-
cials, public figures and matters of public concern; 199 but if we set
these aside and discuss the tort of defamation it becomes clear that
we have yet another example of strict liability, in the sense that
once again we are not concerned with the issue of fault. Regard-
less of why an individual undertook to say something about an-
other or whether there is an issue of mistake, if what was published
defames another, liability will follow. 200 It is safe to say that in
these cases one communicates at her own peril. The only defense,
other than truth, would appear to be the narrow one of privilege.20 '
198. Mike Steenson, Defamation Per Se: Defamation by Mistake?, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 779, 782-83 (2000) (noting that ancient conflict
between the royal and the ecclesiastical courts over the harm caused by de-
famatory statements); see also Patrick J. McNulty, The Law of Defamation:
A Primer for the Iowa Practitioner, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 639, 650 (1996) (stat-
ing that the common law courts of the 16th century developed categories for
certain types of defamatory statements).
199. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-04
(1964) (creating First Amendment protections for the news media in cases
where public officials are alleging defamation); see also HAROLD L. NELSON
& DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR., LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 62-63 (5th ed.
1986) (describing the tension between the right to privacy and freedom of
speech).
200. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 762 (1985) (deciding in an opinion with two justices joining Chief Jus-
tice Powell and another justice concurring, not to extend the First Amend-
ment protections to matters that are not of a public concern); Peshak v.
Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421, 425-26 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that absent any
showing of a particular mental state, a false injurious statement's publication
is sufficient to establish liability, for the presumption is that one intended to
make the statement if it is published); William E. Westerbeke, Survey of
Kansas Tort Law: Part II, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 225, 266 (2002) (noting that
at common law, defamation was a strict liability tort, but the U.S. Supreme
Court's Times v. Sullivan decision modified the rule concerning statements
about public officials).
201. See Nat Stern, Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs: Revisiting a
Problematic Defamation Category, 10 Mo. L. REV. 597, 599 (2000) (noting
that at common law, absent a defense such as truth, the person making the
defamatory statement could be held strictly liable); see also J. Bradley
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The justification for this rule, wherein hardship is almost cer-
tain to follow, is not clearly enunciated, but seems to rest upon the
belief that one's good name should be protected at all costs, and, as
a result, when we weigh the interests of the plaintiffs reputation
against the interests of the defendant in expressing herself, the
plaintiff will almost always win. 202 Perhaps the easiest way to ex-
plain this line of reasoning is with a blanket statement of public
policy. It is better to confine an individual's freedom of expression
203than to see an innocent injured plaintiff suffer.
VIII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Of all the examples and justifications discussed, the area of
workmen's compensation offers the easiest explanation for the
application of strict liability.2 °4 Basically, this is a scenario where
the legislature has stepped in and decreed that liability, regardless
Buckhalter, Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral and the Em-
ployer's Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and Eat it
Too), 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 308 (1998) (noting that truth is an abso-
lute defense that will defeat liability in a defamation case).
202. Snead v. Redland Aggregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir.
1993) (stating that neither the law of Texas nor the Constitution places a
fault requirement for a plaintiff to recover his presumed damages between
private individuals in cases of libel per se); see also Hornby v. Hunter, 385
S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App. 1964) (stating that even an innocently published
statement that results in defamation will subject the statement's publisher to
liability).
203. See Hurlbut v. Gulf At. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex.
1987) (comparing and contrasting the torts of defamation and business dis-
paragement and noting that a defamation action protects the injured party's
personal reputation, whereas the business disparagement action protects the
injured party's economic interests); see also Matt Jackson, One Step For-
ward, Two Steps Back: A Historical Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 368 (2002) (noting the limitations courts
have placed on strict liability in the context of defamation).
204. See Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971, 972
(Minn. 1924) (stating that workmen's compensation statutes are part of the
trend in legislation that even in the absence of any negligence, the individual
should be relieved of any "mischance" of a business); Meech v. Hillhaven
West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 499 (Mont. 1989) (quoting legislative history be-
hind the workmen's compensation statute where it was noted that it would
allow an injured employee to recover without a showing of negligence on
the employer's part).
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of fault, should fall upon an employer.205 Since all jurisdictions
have their own version of this type of legislation, we have elected
to use the Texas workman's compensation statute, which is similar
to that of other jurisdictions, as our focal point for discussion.2 6 In
essence, it provides that whenever one employs more than three
individuals he is eligible for workman's compensation insur-
ance.20 7 So as to encourage this form of coverage, the legislature
has further stated that, should an employer in this type of scenario
fail to secure this insurance, all of the employer's common law
208defenses are rendered inoperable. In any subsequent law suit, he
will not be allowed to allege any common law defense on his be-
half.2°9 If, however, the employer selects such coverage, he will
again be deprived of his common law defenses, but in this instance
205. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 723, 725 (5th
Cir. 1949) (stating that questions of employer negligence are entirely foreign
to the Workmen's Compensation Act, which has as its purpose the provision
of compensation to injured employees); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Lancaster, 71
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App. 1934) (stating that the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act was created as a type of life and accident insurance where, should
certain contingencies happen, the employee would receive payment as long
as the employee had not intentionally induced or provoked the occurrence of
the contingency).
206. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001-506.002 (Vernon 2002);
Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1969)
(stating that the basis of liability in a Texas Workman's Compensation con-
text is different that the basis of liability in a negligence action).
207. See S. Underwriters v. Gallagher, 136 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.
1940) (stating that if an individual holds the status of a Texas employee, that
individual is entitled to the protections of the Workmen's Compensation
statute); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, 300 S.W. 667, 669 (Tex. App.
1927) (holding that employee covered by Workmen's Compensation statute
in one state can also recover under statute of another state if that is where
the injury occurred).
208. Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52, 58 n.3 (Tex.
1998) (noting the limitations on the defenses available to non-subscribing
employers); see also David W. Robertson, The Texas Employer's Liability in
Tort for Injuries to an Employee Occurring in the Course of the Employ-
ment, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1195, 1197 (1993) (stating that the employer who
elects not to subscribe cannot invoke affirmative defenses such as the fellow
servant rule, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence).
209. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (Vernon Supp. 2003); Britt v.
Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (noting that non-subscribing
employer could not avail itself of common law defenses).
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the cost of compensation will be shifted to the insurance carrier. 210
In essence, this is strict liability.21' The employer, regardless of
fault, will be held responsible; the big difference is that in these
cases the financial responsibility is placed upon an insurance car-
rier, and the cost of the insurance is passed to the consumer as part
of the price paid for the goods or services introduced into the
stream of commerce.
212
The upside to this form of coverage is that an employee, once
having established an injury, will be compensated almost immedi-
ately. 2 13 The downside, however, is that seldom does this coverage
equal or come close to what would have been obtained in any sub-
sequent personal injury litigation. 214 There is no argument, how-
ever, that this is strict liability. The reason or justification is sim-
210. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.031; Payne v. Galen Hosp.
Corp., 4 S.W.3d 312, 315 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that an employee's
exclusive remedy for covered accidents is to be found under the statute in
both its former and current version).
211. James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Compari-
son of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 298-
301 (1976) (noting the emergence of worker's compensation laws as signal-
ing a departure from negligence and a move toward a regime akin to "shared
strict liability"); Jeffrey M. Jakubiak, Maintaining Air Safety At Less Cost: A
Plan for Replacing FAA Safety Regulations with Strict Liability, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 429 (1997) (noting that Supreme Court decisions
have made Worker's Compensation statutes "similar to being a true strict
liability scheme").
212. Prescott v. CSPH, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App. 1994)
(stating that under the Worker's Compensation Act, liability attaches to an
insurance carrier for an employee who was injured regardless of the em-
ployer's fault or negligence); see also Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507
S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (noting the "statutory scheme is in lieu of
common law liability based on negligence").
213. Davis v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 704 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. App. 1985)
(stating that the object of the Texas Worker's Compensation Act is to do
away with common-law negligence and attendant issues and to fix the
amount of recovery); see also Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Co., 116
S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. 1938) (noting that the Texas Legislature enacted the
present Workmen's Compensation Law due to the demand for an alteration
in the way employment-related injury disputes were settled).
214. Kenneth M. Koprowicz, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for
Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52
BROOK. L. REv. 183, 192 (1986) (noting that while jury awards for personal
injuries can amount to millions of dollars, worker's compensation awards
are set by schedules).
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ple; the legislature in this type of case has decreed that whenever
an employee is injured on the job, the employer will be responsi-
ble.
2 15
IX. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 402A OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
The idea of strict liability in the area of defective products is
of much more recent vintage than in the area of other torts. 216 It
did not, however, appear unexpectedly. Before the concept was
published in the 1960s as part of the Restatement, it had, as is the
tradition with the American Law Institute, been espoused for dec-
ades. 217 As early as the 1940s, concurring opinions had reasoned
that strict liability should apply whenever a manufacturer under-
took to introduce a defective product into the stream of commerce,
and legal scholars were quick to support this new and novel
idea.2t 8 It was not, however, until 1962, when Justice Roger
Traynor of the Supreme Court of California rendered his decision
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products2 19 that the idea was given its
most important momentum.
In Greenman, the defendant designed, manufactured and mar-
keted a power tool that could be used as a saw, drill press, and
215. Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43,
45 (Tex. 1969) (stating that if employment caused a disease or injury, even
if employer was not at fault, the employer is responsible); Gen. Accident,
Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Evans, 201 S.W. 705, 708 (Tex. App. 1918)
(stating that compensation may be awarded even if employer's negligence
was not the proximate cause of the employee's injury).
216. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, CASES
AND MATERIALS 16 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that there are more products liabil-
ity cases in the latter part of the twentieth century than in any other time);
Charles E. Cantu, Twenty-five Years of Strict Product Liability Law: The
Transformation and Present Meaning of Section 402A, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
327,329 (1993).
217. See OWEN, supra note 216, at 16 (noting that strict manufacturer
liability in warranty and tort exploded into adolescence in the 1950s).
218. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 207-08
(1989-90) (noting that as far back as the 1940s, dissenting and concurring
opinions argued for strict liability application in manufacturing cases).
219. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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wood lathe.220 As a result of a defect in the design, the plaintiff
was injured when, while using the tool as a lathe, a large piece of
wood flew out and struck him in the head, inflicting serious in-
221jury. Justice Traynor's decision was straightforward. First, he
reasoned that strict liability in the area of defective products had
already been applied in the case of unwholesome food, and had
most recently been extended to such other products as a grinding
wheel, bottles, a vaccine, an insect spray, a surgical pin, a skirt, a
tire, a home permanent, a hair dye, and automobiles. 222 Secondly,
Traynor reasoned that in these cases liability had been imposed on
the basis of a warranty which ran from the manufacturer, but that
the abandonment of privity and the inability of a manufacturer to
disclaim warranties actually meant that the cases were in fact de-
cided on the basis of strict liability; he elected to apply this princi-
ple to the case before him.223 From a historical point of view, it is
important to note that this was the first time a court in this type of
case had held for the plaintiff on the basis of strict liability. Two
years later, this decision served as the basis of section 402A of the
224Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is en-
gaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies al-
though (a) the seller has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product
220. Id. at 898.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 900-01.
223. Id. at 901.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.
Section 402A swept the country in a firestorm fashion,2 5 and
it soon became clear that it was going to be interpreted by the
courts to mean more than had originally been expressed.226 Much
has already been said of this explosive reaction and it need not be
discussed here. What is important to our discussion, however, is
the principle of strict liability and how it is applied against one
who has introduced a defective product into the stream of com-
merce.
From its very inception, the courts were clear that section
402A did not call for absolute liability. 7 The idea espoused by
the Restatement was not to make insurers out of manufacturers
who placed a product that caused injury into the market place.
2 28
Instead, the goal was to impose strict liability upon one who intro-
229duced a defective product into the stream of commerce. The
phrase "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
225. Jones v. Allercare, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 290, 307 n.8 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (stating that the plaintiffs in this case claimed that at the turn of the
century, forty-three states had adopted the Restatement's strict liability in
tort for product defects).
226. See William E. Westerbeke, The Source of Controversy in the New
Restatement of Products Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability,
8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I, 6 (1998) (asserting that section 402A at its
inception was intended to address the traditional barriers to recovery, but it
expanded through interpretations to the entire field of products liability); see
also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 779-80
(N.J. 1965) (illustrating the court's willingness to expand section 402A by
showing that a strict liability cause of action might apply to lease situations).
227. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849-
50 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Jackson, 725 S.W.2d 829,
833 (Ark. 1987).
228. See Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (M.D.
Pa. 2001) (stating that to hold that a manufacturer is an insurer of his prod-
uct would be to undermine the policies behind section 402A); see also
Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 637 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (I11. 1994)
(stating that a manufacturer is not an insurer).
229. Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (D. Kan.
1994) (stating that in order to impose strict liability in tort, proof of defect is
required); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pools Co.,
230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975) (stating that a requirement of strict prod-
ucts liability is an unreasonably dangerous defect).
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user or consumer" became one of the most important of section
402A, and it proved to be the most difficult for the courts to inter-
pret.23° Initially, we were unable to distinguish between a product
that was defective and one which simply fell short of our expecta-
tions. 23  The issue was further complicated when we considered
that any product is capable of inflicting harm, and no product is
technologically perfect. 232 The courts added to this quandary when
they acknowledged that a product could be legally defective be-
cause it had been mis-designed, mis-manufactured, or mis-
marketed, and this confusion was compounded because there was
no accepted test for determining each of these conditions.23 3 It is
for these reasons that early decisions interpreting section 402A
were often confusing.234 However, once the concept of defect be-
came established, definite standards began to emerge and a true
image of section 402A became obvious.
230, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (stipulating
that a product must be in a defective condition in order for a plaintiff to have
a cause of action); see generally Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730,
740 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J., dissenting) (noting that the term "defect" has
no clear legal meaning).
231. Gappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1984) (stating
that the issue of when a product is merely a lemon, rather than defective,
may entitle the buyer to revoke his acceptance of the item). This case illus-
trates a different meaning of "defect" than what is applied in strict products
liability cases. When the buyer obtains his product without knowing of the
defects and then later discovers the product's problems by using it, the
buyer's remedy through the Uniform Commercial Code may be to revoke his
acceptance within a reasonable amount of time. Id.
232. See OWEN, supra note 216, at 262 n.3 (stating "all products are
flawed at some technological level"); Cantu, supra note 216, at 334 n.12
(noting that even seemingly harmless products such as ball-point pens and
neckties can cause injuries).
233. J. David Tate, Comment, The American Law Institute Study on
Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury: How Does Texas Tort Law Com-
pare?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 103, 110-11 (1993) (stating that there are three
theories to determine when a product is defective).
234. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1968) (com-
menting that "to speak in terms of 'defect' only causes confusion").
Vol. 33
Strict Liability: Torts v. Products Liability
A. Mis-manufactured Products
The first idea to take hold was that a product could be defec-
tive because it had been mis-assembled.2 35 This condition is usu-
ally attributable to the fact that substandard raw materials have
been used in the construction of the goods or that they were as-
sembled in a manner not intended by the manufacturer. 236 Their
present state may be a result of some latent deficiency or, in turn,
due to something as simple as a missing screw or a bolt that has
not been adequately tightened. 37 In any case, however, it is clear
that the product stands alone; it is different from the rest of the de-
fendant's production. 238 For this reason, the best standard, which
ultimately emerged for determining defect, is what is referred to as
the reasonable expectations test.239  This test uses an objective
235. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unrea-
sonably Dangerous Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (1994)
(stating that not long after the inception of section 402A, scholarly commen-
tary argued for the position that only mis-manufacture cases fell within the
ambit of the section 402A); see also Yamaha Motor Co. v. Thornton, 579
So. 2d 619, 622-23 (Ala. 1991) (showing that where a motorcycle speed
reduction plate had been left off through the mis-manufacture of the item,
strict products liability applied).
236. Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1972)
(finding evidence that the raw material supplied for the defective fan blades
that caused the plaintiff's injuries was a type of "dirty" steel); Curtiss v.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 511 P.2d 991, 1000 (Wash. 1973) (Hamilton,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that it was clear that the
injuries of the plaintiff were caused by improper assembly).
237. Keeler v. Richards Mfg. Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1197, 1199 (5th Cir.
1987) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case where a surgeon
had inserted a hip screw during an operation and, months later, the screw
broke); O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir.
1950) (showing that a wheel barrow tire exploded after its metal rivets,
which had been weakened during the assembly process, came apart).
238. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex. 2000)
(stating that to recover in strict liability for a manufacturing defect, it must
be shown that the product's "construction or quality deviates from the speci-
fications or planned output in a way that is unreasonably dangerous"); Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997) (stating that a
manufacturing "defect is a deviation from the planned output").
239. David A. Fischer, Product Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39
Mo. L. REV. 339, 348 (1974) (conveying the information that the test meas-
uring the reasonable expectations of the consumer is a natural fit for analyz-
ing whether a product is defective); see also Sperry-New Holland v.
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standard, usually employed by the jury as a question of fact, and is
reminiscent of the implied warranty of merchantability that is
found in the Uniform Commercial Code. 240 The question be-
comes: did the product meet the reasonable expectations of the
user consumer?
Generally, this issue is determined by looking to three crite-
ria.2 4 1 There may be others, but the principle ones are: product
usage, product characteristics and the manufacturer's advertise-
ments. 242 Under the first, we are concerned with the purpose for
which the product is ordinarily used.24 3 Consumers have become
Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993) (explaining that under the rea-
sonable expectations test, a defective product must be one that the ordinary
consumer would not know to be unreasonably dangerous).
240. See Rebecca Tustin Rutherford, Comment, Changes in the Land-
scape of Products Liability Law: An Analysis of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 209, 224 (1997) (stating the consumer expecta-
tions test is easy to administer and is determined from the ordinary con-
sumer's standpoint); see also Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,
454 (Cal. 1978) (stating that the consumer expectation test is somewhat
analogous to the warranty of fitness and merchantability found in the Uni-
form Commercial Code).
241. See Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The
Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning
Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 283, 315 n.105 (1995) (explaining that the
consumer expectation test examines a product for defectiveness through the
lens of the product's characteristics or common usage); Marshall S. Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370
(1974) (theorizing that a characteristic to be examined for a product's defec-
tiveness is its advertising).
242. See Jankowski, supra note 241, at 315 n.105; Shapo, supra note
241, at 1370; see also Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975) (stating that the consumer ex-
pectation test is based on the characteristics of the type of product). But see
Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Talbert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (consid-
ering a number of factors under a version of the reasonable expectations test
that takes into account potential harm from the defective product as well as
the more traditional characteristics).
243. Syrie v. Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
for a products liability action based on strict liability, the defective manufac-
ture of a product must be one that the ordinary consumer would not contem-
plate); Cook v. Downing, 891 P.2d 611, 613 n.1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994)
(pointing out that a good's ordinary purposes are contained within the idea
of the product's merchantability and reinforce the idea of the good's cus-
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accustomed to relying upon and, in fact, demand that the goods
they have purchased are suitable for their intended purpose. The
second involves the appearance of the product.244 It goes without
saying that consumers expect more from rugged heavy machinery
than they do from delicate fine precision tools.245 Finally, the third
criterion relies upon the statements and claims made by the manu-
facturer in its advertisements; the projected image of the goods.
246
If the defendant has gone to great lengths in creating an expecta-
tion concerning its product, the consuming public should hold it to
its word.
Since reasonable minds may differ on the outcome of these
questions, the issue is best left to the jury.247 Did the product in
question meet the reasonable expectations of the user consumer?
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the product is not defective.
However, if the jury comes back with a negative answer, then




244. Shapo, supra note 241, at 1370 (stating that a consumer's expecta-
tions are built upon a product's appearance as well as the consensus of the
product's function).
245. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1967) (stating
that a "rugged" Ford truck could be expected by an ordinary consumer to
negotiate rough terrain).
246. Id. at 809-10 (showing that the plaintiff in a defective manufac-
turing case referred to advertising data to support his consumer expectations
theory); see also Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Prod-
ucts Liability Theory, 107 HARV. L. REV. 895, 904-06 (1994) (conveying
the information that courts have considered a product's advertising as a
means of establishing that product's defectiveness since advertising influ-
ences a consumer's expectations).
247. Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1978)
(finding reversible error in the jury charge on the issue of defectiveness);
Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1975) (noting how the jury
found some scaffolding to be defective and unreasonably dangerous).
248. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th
Cir. 1967) (implying that where there is evidence of a miscarriage in the
production of a product, a manufacturing defect may lie); see also Bailey H.
Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 863, 896 n.143 (2001) (identifying "the 'representational'
theory of consumer expectations whereby" the manufacturer's "image-
making", advertising, and appearance are analyzed).
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B. Mis-designed Products
From a historical perspective, it is clear that the issue of mis-
designed products is the one which gave us the most difficulty.
249
At the outset, it must be noted that a finding of mis-design, unlike
that of mis-manufacture, will condemn the defendant's entire line
of production. 25  This type of product does not stand alone but in
fact is identical to the manufacturer's entire output. It is for this
reason that the courts exerted themselves more when attempting to
determine an adequate standard for defect. 25 1 As a result, different
tests were advanced. With differing combinations and with vary-
ing degrees of enthusiasm, the various tests set forth for determin-
ing whether a product has been mis-designed have been: (1)
whether the product met the reasonable expectations of the user
consumer (the exact same standard for determining mis-
manufacture which added to the confusion mentioned above); (2)
whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have placed this
product into the stream of commerce had it been aware of the risk
posed by the present design; (3) whether the product was in a con-
249. Acord v. Gen. Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Tex. 1984)
(showing how the development of rules dealing with the jury charge in mis-
design cases created a complicated history of case law in Texas); see also
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1142 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979))
(recapitulating the history of how the jury instruction for mis-design was
changed through case law and setting forth the jury instruction for mis-
design cases as follows: "'By the term 'defectively designed' as used in this
issue is meant a product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking
into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use'27)0. John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the
Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 704 n.122
(1988) (stating that to find a design defective is to find the entire production
line defective); see Michelle Capezza, Comment, Controlling Guns: A Call
for Consistency in Judicial Review of Challenges to Gun Control Legisla-
tion, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1486 n.65 (1995) (stating that each unit
of the production line that produced a misdesigned product represents a po-
tential lawsuit).
251. See Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.
1979) (showing the careful analysis of the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals in
determining which factors should be balanced in mis-design cases); see also
Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex. 1977) (stat-
ing the broad form submission of the definition of defective design did not
cause the rendition of an improper judgment).
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dition considered to be unreasonably dangerous; and finally, (4)
whether the risk created by the product as presently designed out-
weighed its utility to the consuming public or its benefit to soci-
ety.
52
After a period of time, the last test, designated as the risk-
benefit analysis, emerged as the predominant standard for deter-
mining design defect.2 53 It is expressed as PL (G) > B = D, and is
almost identical to the formula set forth early on for determining
negligence. 254 In this instance we again multiply the probability of
loss, PL, times the gravity of the foreseeable harm, G, and compare
this total against the burden of eliminating or at least reducing the
injury, B.255 The result is a defective product where B is less than
the product of the first two variables. In this case, however, B,
the burden, is not concerned with the behavior of the defendant,
but instead with a feasible alternative to the product under consid-
eration.257
252. David A. Curran, Note, Funds v. Big Tobacco and the Proximate
Cause Issue: A Framework for Derivative Injuries, 80 TEX. L. REV. 393,
396 n.16 (2001) (stating that in design defect cases, generally courts adopt
one of two tests); Michael J. Toke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts and
Design Defectiveness in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 239, 257 (1996) (taking issue with courts using the reasonable
expectation test in misdesign cases).
253. See, e.g., Brown v. Link Belt Div. of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110,
115 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating the balancing test is mandated when determining
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous).
254. Compare Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 1987 WL 6486, at *16-17
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987) (setting out the formula for the risk utility test),
with United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(establishing Judge Hand's famous formula for negligence).
255. See Baker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978)
(showing the factors that are used in applying what would become known as
the risk benefit test); see also Todd v. BIC, 9 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (7th Cir.
1993) (considering issues of both mis-design and mis-marketing and utiliz-
ing the risk benefit test).
256. See Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. 1999)
(showing the risk utility test being used for a design defect case); see also
Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that the jury could find by using the risk utility test that the risk of harm
outweighed the benefits of the product).
257. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. 1999)
(stating that the plaintiff must show an alternative design is technologically
feasible); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harper, 61 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex.
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When investigating this issue of a feasible alternative, the jury
will, as a rule, consider the following factors: cost, marketability,
state of the art, utility and safety.258 Cost is an important issue be-
cause in a capitalistic economy we will not expect the manufactur-
ers to spend themselves into oblivion. The cost of this alternative
design must, therefore, be reasonable. 259 Marketability is also a
factor. 260 Manufacturers are in the business of selling; as a result,
it would be unthinkable to require a design that will not be ac-
cepted by consumers. State of the art must be considered. 261 We
will require only that which is technologically feasible. 26  If the
App. 2001) (stating that an alternative design that is safer must be shown to
exist, that the risk of injury must be reduced by the alternative design, and it
must be economically and technologically feasible).
258. See Guzman v. Synthes (USA), 20 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.
1999) (noting that implicit in any safer alternative design is the technologi-
cal and economic possibility of that design); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546
S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. App. 1977) (holding that a stove that was defective
could have been made safer at a cost of only an additional $1.50 per unit).
259. See Hannah v. Greg, Bland, & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 860
(Ala. 2002) (discussing alternative design and showing that under the ex-
amination of an expert, the cost of the alternative design was part of the
testimony); see also Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 532 (5th
Cir. 2001) (noting that with the inherent limitations of the availability of
relevant data, a plaintiff cannot be expected to prove with particularity the
economic costs a manufacturer would incur if the manufacturer were to em-
ploy the suggested alternative design).
260. Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 695 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522-
23 (N.Y. 1999) (stating that function and monetary cost is a factor to any
alternative design); see also John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liabil-
ity of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734,
750 (1983) (contending that price of an alternative design determines
whether a product will remain in the marketplace).
261. See Connally v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139
(S.D. Ala. 1999) (noting that an alternative design must be able to be
adapted to the current market and the state of the art is a factor); Fibreboard
Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo. 1993) (noting that although the
issue had to do with defective marketing, state of the art evidence is admis-
sible with respect to design defect cases as well). But see Besheda v. Johns
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) (declining to factor in
state of the art in the determination of defectiveness).
262. Rexrode v. Am. Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 832 (10th Cir.
1982) (concluding that if the technology was not available at the time of the
product's making, manufacturers should not be held strictly liable); Gary C.
Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict
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alternative design is impossible to achieve, we will not consider it.
Utility is important.263 If the proposed design does not fulfill the
needs of the consuming public, it is by definition not feasible. Fi-
nally, the issue of safety is of the utmost importance.2 64 The ulti-
mate concern before the court is a safer product, and whether or
not the alternative design meets this goal must be considered by
the jury.265
While this test appears similar to the one for determining neg-
ligence, 266 there are some very important distinctions. First, in this
instance our focus is different. We are not concerned with a negli-
gent defendant, but instead with whether we have a defective
product. 267 A second difference is that under 402A the defendant
manufacturer is charged with knowledge of a defect, whereas in
Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1982) (arguing that
as part of the ultimate issue of defectiveness, the jury answers questions of a
feasible alternative design).
263. See Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1978)
(showing that the blade guard on a saw could not be non removable without
impairing the saw's utility).
264. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335
(Tex. 1998) (stating that alternative designs must be safer and reasonable);
see also McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 499 (Minn. 1967)
(attaching strict liability on manufacturer for the unreasonable risk the prod-
uct posed to the public).
265. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 335 n.4 (making clear that a reasonably
safer alternative design is a prerequisite to a finding of defectiveness that is
to be determined by the jury); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638
S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App. 1982) (stating that a finding of defectiveness by
the jury may be influenced by evidence of a safer alternative design).
266. Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1636 (1997) (noting that the defective design test uses a
formula similar to the one used for a negligence determination); see also
Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1102 (Wash. 1984) (Dimmick,
J., dissenting) (noting a proposal in the state's legislative tort reform history
to introduce a balancing test based on risk and utility that was closely related
to the negligence test).
267. See Wallace v. Ford Motor Co., 723 A.2d 1226, 1229 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (stating that a design defect analysis focuses on the
condition of the product); see also David A. Urban, Comment, Custom's
Proper Role in Strict Products Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38
UCLA L. REV. 439, 471-72 (1990) (acknowledging the close relationship
between Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula and the risk benefit test
used for defective design).
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negligence the defendant manufacturer is held to the standard of
268the reasonable and prudent expert. Finally, in this area the bur-
den is involved, not with the defendant's conduct, but instead with
whether we have a feasible alternative to the design under consid-
eration.
269
After some trial and error, this test emerged as the prevailing
one for determining whether the defendant's product was mis-
designed.27° It is easy for the jury to apply and is best suited for
situations where an addition, modification or deletion to the exist-




The final perspective of defectiveness involves marketing.
272
In this instance, we are involved with the safe and effective use of
268. Eaves v. Hyster Co., 614 N.E.2d 214, 216 (III. App. Ct. 1993)
(stating that under Illinois law, a jury may presume in negligence actions
that a manufacturer has expert knowledge and skill); see also Foster v. Ford
Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1311 n.17 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that a manu-
facturer is required to foresee risks that would not be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer).
269. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. 1995) (stat-
ing that courts evaluate defective design in terms of safer alternative de-
signs); Nowak, 638 S.W.2d at 585 (emphasizing a safer alternative design as
a factor to be considered by the jury).
270. See Cantu, supra note 216, at 335 (stating that the risk benefit
analysis has been the most frequently used standard in the misdesign area);
see also Brown v. Link Belt Div. of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.
1982) ("In defining unreasonably dangerous, a balancing test is mandated: if
the likelihood and gravity of harm outweigh the benefits and utility of the
product, the product is unreasonably dangerous.").
271. Michael J. Toke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design
Defectiveness in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 239, 249 (1996) (noting that in the draft Restatement, the risk utility
test was the preferred one in design defect cases); see also Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982) (stating that in a defective
design case, if there are no safer alternatives, the risk benefit test should be
applied).
272. Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 493, 503-04 (Tex.
App. 2002) (setting forth what elements a plaintiff must prove in a market-
ing defect case); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j
(1965) (noting that a "seller may be required to give directions or warning,
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the goods, which has a direct correlation to the warnings as well as
the instructions that accompany the product. 273 Oddly, and this
was probably a minor cause of the confusion referred to above, we
encounter two similarities with mis-design that arose in the preced-
274ing section. The first is that the manufacturer once again in-
tended to place its product into the stream of commerce in its pre-
sent condition. 275 As a result, this means that a finding of defec-
tiveness will once again condemn the defendant's entire line of
product. 276 Secondly, the test which finally emerged for determin-
ing whether the information accompanying the product was suffi-
cient or lacking is the risk-benefit analysis.
277
When applying this test, we once again measure the probabil-
ity of loss, PL, times the gravity of the foreseeable harm, G, and
weigh the sum of these two variables against B, the burden of
eliminating or at least reducing the risk in question. 278 In this in-
on the container [of a product] as to its use").
273. OWEN, supra note 216, at 329-31 (explaining that a marketing de-
fect can occur when the manufacturer has failed to give "adequate warnings
and instructions"); see also Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d
851, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1975) (theorizing that the marketing could have been
made safer if the label that included warnings against mismatching parts of
tire rims had been stamped on the actual components of the rim).
274. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Restatement Third, Torts: Products
Liability: What Hath the ALl Wrought?, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 501, 506 (1997)
(stating that the similarities in determining whether a product is defective
due to mis-design or defective marketing both result in condemning the
manufacturer's entire production line).
275. Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1963)
(stating in this pre-402A case that failure to warn of dangers of a product
that is going into the stream of commerce as intended is the hallmark of
negligent marketing); see also Hageney v. Jackson Furniture of Danville,
Inc., 746 So. 2d 912, 925 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (providing jury instruction
that states a product may be defective if it lacks adequate warnings and has
gone out into the stream of commerce as intended by the manufacturer).
276. Henderson, supra note 274, at 506.
277. Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo. 1993)
(noting how the risk benefit test for design defect cases is similar to the test
used for marketing defect cases); see also Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem.
Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 807 (Wash. 2000) (stating that most courts concur that a
balancing of risks and benefits must be performed in both marketing and
design cases).
278. USX Corp. v. Salinas, 818 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Tex. App. 1991)
(stating that prior decisions of the Texas Supreme Court utilize a test for
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stance, however, we are not concerned with the idea of a feasible
alternative to the design of the product, but instead, with the issue
of whether the warnings and instructions accompanying the prod-
uct are sufficient. 279 This is a very delicate issue. Manufacturers
cannot be expected to warn and issue instructions as to all foresee-
able risks.280 The consequence of such a process would result in a
voluminous amount of information being conveyed to the user
consumer which in all probability would be ignored.281 At first
blush, this problem is further exaggerated by the risk-benefit
analysis employed. It would appear that the burden of an addi-
tional warning or instruction would always be less than the fore-
seeable risk of harm, which would by necessity always result in a
jury finding of defectiveness. The solution, and the reasoning is
admittedly circuitous, is to require only that amount of information
which is considered to be adequate. 82 Adequate information is
defined as those warnings and instructions that would satisfy the
marketing defects that is "indistinguishable" from the negligence test); see
also Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that a product may be defective if the magnitude of the risk outweighs its
utility and even where the balance tips in favor of its utility, adequate warn-
ings must be given).
279. Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. App.
1995) (noting that a marketing defect occurs when the manufacturer can
foresee the risk but fails to provide adequate warnings of that risk or fails to
instruct on the safe use of the product); Lujan v. Tampo Mfg. Co., 825
S.W.2d 505, 510 (Tex. App. 1992) (stating that a marketing defect involves
the failure to adequately warn of the dangers or instruct on the safe use).
280. See Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (D. Conn.
1986) (stating a manufacturer cannot be expected to warn individuals of
facts already known to the individuals); OWEN, supra note 216, at 330 (stat-
ing that too much information may result in warnings pollution).
281. See OWEN, supra note 216, at 330 (stating that too much informa-
tion may result in warnings pollution); see also Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
41 A.2d 850, 852 (Pa. 1945) (showing a different type of warnings pollution
when the manufacturer called his product "Safety Clean" and emblazoned
this name in large letters several times around the outside of the can, thus
rendering the warnings of danger less conspicuous).
282. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978)
(stating that where a manufacturer knows or should know of risks with a
product, adequate warnings must be provided); see also Copeland v. Ash-
land Oil, Inc., 373 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that while
sufficiency of a warning is normally a jury question, in the present case, the
warnings were adequate as a matter of law).
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reasonable prudent person. 283 Since reasonable minds will differ
on this issue, it is a question of fact for the jury. 284 As a result, a
jury finding that the information in question is adequate will result
in a finding of non-defectiveness, and vice versa.
D. Unreasonably Dangerous Products
Section 402A begins: "One who sells any product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous ....,,285 This phrase has
been interpreted to mean that in addition to proving defectiveness,
the plaintiff also has the burden of establishing that such condition
286renders the product unreasonably dangerous. The requirement
on the plaintiff is therefore twofold. This element was inserted, no
doubt, to distinguish between those products that can cause harm
even though nothing is wrong with them (any product regardless of
its nature is capable of inflicting injury), those products that are
flawed but cause no injury (no product is technologically perfect),
and ultimately those that are defective and as a result produce a
foreseeable risk.287 The intention of the Restatement is to impose
liability only in the last instance.
283. Bituminous Cas. Co., 518 S.W.2d at 873 (stating that an adequate
warning is one that would catch the attention of a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances of the product's use); see also M. Stuart Madden, Selected
Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of Cor-
rective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1056 (1998) (explaining
that an adequate warning will impress upon a reasonably prudent user of the
product the characteristics of its hazards).
284. Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tex.
App. 1978) (stating that adequacy of warnings is a question that the jury
normally decides).
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
286. Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analy-
sis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423, 440 (1997) (explaining that a plaintiff must
prove that a product is defective in order to recover from a manufacturer);
Robert F. Thompson, The Arkansas Products Liability Statute: What Does
"Unreasonably Dangerous" Mean in Arkansas?, 50 ARK. L. REV. 663, 666-
67 (1998) (stating that Arkansas law requires that the plaintiff prove the
unreasonably unsafe condition of the product as well as the fact that the
product caused the injuries of the plaintiff).
287. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal.
1978) (setting forth the requirement that a plaintiff prove the product was
both unreasonably dangerous as well as the cause of the injury to the plain-
tiff); see also Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976) (ex-
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E. A Different Form of Strict Liability
In light of this discussion, it becomes clear that in this area of
the law we are not applying strict liability in its usual form. In-
stead, we have what should be referred to as strict products liabil-
ity. 288 The requirement of a design, manufacturing, or marketing
defect that results in goods that are unreasonably dangerous distin-
guishes this concept from those previously discussed. 2 89 As a re-
sult, we have a different and distinct basis for imposing liability
which is in no way related to the other areas of tort.
X. CONCLUSION
As a general rule, liability in our Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence is imposed, not because the plaintiff is injured, but
because the plaintiff's injury is a result of the defendant's fault.
Fault is based upon the idea that the defendant either intended the
injury or was negligent in failing to act in a reasonable manner
once confronted with a foreseeable risk. We have seen, however,
that in a very small number of cases fault is not an issue. In these
instances, the courts will impose liability regardless of fault or, as
it is sometimes referred to, strict liability.
plaining that the plaintiff must establish that the product was both unrea-
sonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer and the cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries).
288. William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 651 (1991) (stating that strict products
liability is not true strict liability); see also Thomas A. Matthews, Products
Liability in Alaska-A Practitioner's Overview, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1993) (stating that from the distinct theories of strict liability and breach of
warranty, strict products liability evolved).
289. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Of-
fers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV.
858, 868 n.52 (1999) (noting that strict products liability, which requires
proof of defect, should be differentiated from strict liability); Mark Geist-
feld, Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the Tort-Contract Issue in Products
Liability, 15 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 241, 248 n.23 (1995) (noting that strict
products liability, which requires proof of product defect, is not the same as
strict liability).
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Strict liability is confined to a very few and limited number of
scenarios, and in each case the justification for doing so is differ-
ent. For example, strict liability is imposed for harm caused by a
trespassing animal due to the owner's lack of control over the ani-
mal, which is likely to cause harm once it enters into the close of
another. On the other hand, strict liability is imposed for injury
inflicted by a wild animal or a domesticated one with vicious ten-
dencies because injury is foreseeable and the individual who un-
dertakes to keep such an animal does so at his own risk. In the
area of ultra-hazardous activities, strict liability is justified on the
basis that an individual has undertaken an activity that is inappro-
priate to the locale and poses great risk of harm to others. Nui-
sance, either private or public, will justify strict liability if the ac-
tivity in question is one which also qualifies as an ultra-hazardous
activity.
In cases involving a misrepresentation, there is a deliberate
policy to place any resulting loss upon the defendant, even if inno-
cent, rather than upon the innocent plaintiff. This is especially true
in a sales transaction wherein the defendant purports to have
knowledge concerning the matter in question. On the other hand,
in the area of vicarious liability, there are a variety of justifications
for strict liability. The element of control, the theory of the busi-
ness enterprise having the deepest pocket which would make it
easier to compensate an injured plaintiff, and the allocation of risk
have each been expressed as a reason for holding an employer
strictly liable for the torts of her employees. Meanwhile, the law
of defamation holds the publisher strictly liable on the basis that it
is better to confine an individual's freedom of expression than to
see an innocent injured plaintiff suffer from a loss of standing in
the community. Finally, strict liability is justified in the area of
workmen's compensation only because the legislature has stepped
in and decreed that liability, regardless of fault, should fall upon an
employer when her employee is injured on the job.
All of the above are distinguished from the concept of strict
products liability, which derives its justification from one having
introduced an unreasonably dangerous defective product into the
market place. As illustrated, we speak in terms of strict liability,
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